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Introduction
A perfectly reasonable response to reading the title might be: who
cares? Pennoyer v. Neff1 was decided in 1878. Since 1945, the “minimum
contacts” test has governed personal jurisdiction.2 What difference does
jurisdictional law regarding corporations around the time of Pennoyer
make?3 It’s a fair question. However, Justices Gorsuch and Thomas

†

Lillis Family Distinguished Professor of Law, Creighton University;
member New York, California, and Nebraska bars. Thanks to Michael
Hoffheimer, Peter Hay, Rich Freer, and Terri Heady for their helpful
comments.

1.

95 U.S. 714 (1878).

2.

See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

3.

See Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1249, 1251
(2017) [hereinafter Sachs, Pennoyer] (noting that Pennoyer is often
viewed as rendered obsolete by International Shoe).
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care.4 Justice Alito seems to as well.5 Other Justices might come to care.
If they care enough, it might usher in a revolutionary change in the
Supreme Court’s jurisdictional jurisprudence with the promise of
greater predictability and fairer results.
Professor Linda Silberman coined the term “tag” jurisdiction to
describe the phenomenon of individual defendants being subject to in
personam jurisdiction if served with process while in the forum state,
no matter how briefly or for what purpose.6 Once thought to be on the
constitutional rocks,7 in 1990 the Supreme Court unanimously upheld
tag jurisdiction over an individual defendant while in the forum state
for three days on personal business.8 “Corporate tag jurisdiction”—as I
use the term—means obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a
corporation by serving a corporate officer, agent or representative while
the recipient is in the forum state.9
Here a distinction between “casual” and “business” corporate tag
jurisdiction becomes crucial. Casual corporate tag jurisdiction is the
assertion of jurisdiction over a corporation based on forum-state service
of a corporate officer or agent, even if that officer or agent is in the
state on personal business and the corporation has no significant
presence in the forum state.10 Business corporate tag jurisdiction is the
assertion of jurisdiction based upon forum-state service on an officer

4.

Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1037
(2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (joined by Justice
Thomas).

5.

Id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[F]or the reasons
outlined in Justice Gorsuch’s thoughtful opinion, there are grounds for
questioning the standard that the Court adopted in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington . . . .”).

6.

See Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 33, 75 (1978) (coining the term “tag” jurisdiction to describe the
in-state service rule). In one well-known case, the defendant was held
subject to jurisdiction while served on a commercial airplane while flying
over the forum state. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 443
(E.D. Ark. 1959).

7.

See, e.g., Nehemiah v. Athletics Cong. of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 47–48
(3d Cir. 1985) (holding tag jurisdiction unconstitutional without
minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state); Harold
M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 312 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) (same). But see Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d
264, 270–71 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding tag jurisdiction constitutional).

8.

See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619, 628 (1990).

9.

Cody J. Jacobs, If Corporations Are People, Why Can’t They Play Tag?,
46 N.M. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2016) (arguing that corporations should be subject
to tag jurisdiction).

10.

See, e.g., Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y. 137, 139–41 (1881).
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while there on corporate business or on a designated agent for service
of process, if the corporation has a significant forum-state presence.11
Corporations are now likely impossible to tag either in the casual
or business sense.12 Some debate continues as to whether Justice
Holmes’s century-old opinion in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v.
Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co.,13 allowing states to assert business
corporate tag jurisdiction, remains good law.14 Squaring business tag (to
say nothing of casual tag) with recent Supreme Court cases drastically
limiting state-court general jurisdiction15 over corporations is—to put it
11.

See, e.g., Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. v. Pa. Fire Ins. Co., 184 S.W.
999, 1003, 1021 (Mo. 1916) (upholding a state statute permitting service
of process on a designated corporate agent), aff’d, 243 U.S. 93 (1917);
Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075, 1077 (N.Y.
1916) (“[W]hen a foreign corporation is engaged in business in New York,
and is here represented by an officer, he is its agent to accept service,
though the cause of action has no relation to the business here
transacted.”).

12.

See, e.g., Fidrych v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 952 F.3d 124, 136 (4th Cir. 2020)
(holding that general jurisdiction based on a corporate-registration statute
cannot be reconciled with modern minimum-contacts analysis); Brown v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 641 (2d Cir. 2016) (Connecticut’s
corporate-registration statute cannot confer general jurisdiction); King v. Am.
Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570, 580 (9th Cir. 2011) (Montana corporateregistration statute cannot confer general jurisdiction); Aybar v. Aybar,
177 N.E.3d 1257, 1258 (N.Y. 2021) (New York corporate registration statute
does not confer general jurisdiction); Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.,
No. 3 EAP 2021, 2021 WL 6067172 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2021) (Pennsylvania
corporate registration statute purporting to confer general jurisdiction over
registrants is unconstitutional).

13.

243 U.S. 93 (1917).

14.

Compare Fidrych, 952 F.3d at 136 (reasoning that Pennsylvania Fire was
implicitly overruled by modern general jurisdiction cases), with Cooper
Tire & Rubber Co., 863 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. 2021) (Georgia registration statute
confers general, but not specific, jurisdiction); Forest Lab’ys., Inc. v.
Amneal Pharms. LLC, No. 14–508–LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at *3–4 (D.
Del. Feb. 26, 2015) (holding that Delaware registration statute confers
general jurisdiction). See also Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth
Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World,
64 Fla. L. Rev. 387, 436–41 (2012) (discussing jurisdiction based on
registration statutes).

15.

The Supreme Court uses the term “general jurisdiction” to refer to a
defendant being subject to personal jurisdiction regardless of the cause of
action; the Court sometimes now refers to this as “all-purpose”
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Corporations must be “essentially at home” to
be subject to general jurisdiction. Id. The Court has used the term
“general jurisdiction,” and its counterpart “specific jurisdiction”
(jurisdiction only on related causes of action, or as it is sometimes called,
“case-linked” jurisdiction) for many years. See, e.g., Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, nn.8–9 (1984). The
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mildly—a challenge.16 But before the Supreme Court’s decision in
Pennoyer, and well after, corporations were fairly easy to tag. States
widely allowed business corporate tag,17 and some allowed casual tag.18
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court19
provides a reason to think again about corporate tag jurisdiction in all
its forms. In its seventh personal-jurisdiction opinion since 2011, the
Supreme Court found (in two consolidated cases) that defendant Ford
Motor Company had minimum contacts with the forum states in
products-liability actions brought by plaintiffs injured there by Ford’s
vehicles.20 After six straight Supreme Court victories for defendants,21
plaintiffs got one in the win column—this time unanimously. The
majority opinion held Ford’s forum-state contacts were purposeful and
sufficiently related to the plaintiffs’ suits to allow specific jurisdiction,22
even though the allegedly defective vehicles were initially sold in

terms were invented in a famous law-review article. See Arthur T. von
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1136 (1966).
16.

See, e.g., Fidrych, 952 F.3d at 136 (concluding that Pennsylvania Fire
was implicitly overruled by modern general-jurisdiction cases). However,
some well-known scholars defend corporate jurisdiction by registration, at
least in a limited fashion. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Consent to
Jurisdiction Based on Registering to Do Business: A Limited Role for
General Jurisdiction, 58 San Diego L. Rev. 309, 311 (2021) (arguing
that registration should confer jurisdiction if claim is asserted by forumstate plaintiff).

17.

See, e.g., Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. v. Pa. Fire Ins. Co., 184 S.W.
999 (Mo. 1916), aff’d, 243 U.S. 93 (1917).

18.

See generally Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y. 137 (1881).

19.

141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).

20.

Id. at 1031–32.

21.

See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773
(2017); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014);
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011);
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).

22.

“Specific jurisdiction” is the term used by the Supreme Court to describe
assertions of jurisdiction over defendants if the claims are related to the
defendant’s purposeful activities in the state, even if those activities are
isolated. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024–25. For example, the Supreme Court
allowed jurisdiction over a Texas life insurer in a California court where
the only known contact between the insurer and the forum state was that
the Texas life insurer had sold a single life insurance policy there. See
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). For a discussion of the
contrast between specific and general jurisdiction, see supra note 15. The
McGee claim was to collect on the California policy, creating an obvious
relationship between the claim and the defendant’s forum-state contacts.
McGee, 355 U.S. at 222–23.
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another state and reached the forum state via private resales.23 Justice
Alito “quibble[d]” with the majority’s definition of a related contact
and so concurred only in the judgment.24
Then came Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in the judgment, joined
by Justice Thomas.25 Justice Gorsuch, like Alito, did not join the
majority’s minimum-contacts analysis, even though he concluded Ford
Motor Company had minimum contacts with the forum states.26
However, in the second part of his opinion, he questioned on textualist
and originalist grounds the foundations of the minimum-contacts test
and wondered about the legitimacy of the solicitous treatment
corporate defendants receive under modern jurisdictional law.27
In this article I devote little attention to the Court’s competing
minimum-contacts analyses. I do not denigrate scholarly attention to
this aspect of Ford, but it surely will receive thorough examination in
other law review articles. Instead, I focus on Justice Gorsuch’s tentative
inquiry into the originalist case—or lack thereof—for imposing
significant due-process constraints on state-court jurisdiction,
particularly over corporations.
In Part I, I review the second portion of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion.
In Part II, I review the Pennoyer-era Supreme Court jurisdictional cases
and related scholarship; I conclude, as I have before, that the
conventional view of Pennoyer—establishing the Due Process Clause
itself as a limitation on state-court jurisdiction—might be a “giant
misunderstanding.”28 In Part III, I examine state decisions on corporate
tag jurisdiction (particularly casual tag) in the time immediately
following Pennoyer to see what lessons can be learned from the nowsevere restraints on state-court long-arm jurisdiction over out-of-state
corporations. I focus on New York’s Pope29 rule, which allowed casual
corporate tag jurisdiction (in Pope, the corporate president was served

23.

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1029.

24.

Id. at 1033 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).

25.

Id. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

26.

Id. at 1035–36.

27.

Id. at 1037–39.

28.

See Patrick J. Borchers, The Muddy-Booted, Disingenuous Revolution in
Personal Jurisdiction, 70 Fla. L. Rev. F. 21, 22 (2018) [hereinafter
Borchers, Muddy-Booted]; see also Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths
of “State Sovereignty” and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence
of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 699, 699–700 (1983)
(“International Shoe should have rendered obsolete both state sovereignty
and its cousin, forum state interest, as determinants of personal
jurisdiction.”).

29.

Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y. 137 (1881).
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while passing through New York on family vacation).30 Finally, in Part
IV, I address what might come if the Supreme Court were to accept the
invitation of Justice Gorsuch—and that of some law professors
(including me)—to fundamentally reconsider jurisdictional due process.
I suggest that, rather than continuing to attempt to refine the
doctrinally suspect minimum-contacts test, it be abandoned and
jurisdictional due process be united with procedural-due-process norms.
Justice Gorsuch is on the right track. Termites infest the house of
constitutionalized personal jurisdiction and the minimum-contacts test.
Recent scholarship has laid bare its practical shortcomings.31 A growing
body of work shows that the conventional account of Pennoyer invoking
the Due Process Clause to “fix[] in constitutional amber”32 the thenaccepted general bases of personal jurisdiction is at best highly
problematic.33 If the house collapses, something better might be built in
its place.
30.

See Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 31 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 238, 239 (N.Y.
Gen. Term), aff’d, 87 N.Y. 137 (1881).

31.

See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Twilight of the Minimum Contacts
Test, 11 Seton Hall Cir. Rev. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Borchers, Twilight];
Donald L. Doernberg, Resoling International Shoe, 2 Tex. A&M L. Rev.
247 (2014); Robin J. Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal
Jurisdiction, 74 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 23 (2018); Michael H.
Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 Fla. L.
Rev. 499 (2018) [hereinafter Hoffheimer, Stealth Revolution]; Michael H.
Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 Kan. L. Rev. 549 (2012); Cody J. Jacobs,
In Defense of Territorial Jurisdiction, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1589 (2018)
(arguing for the revival of pre-minimum contacts bases of jurisdiction such
as quasi-in-rem and corporate presence jurisdiction; this proposal is
critiqued in Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Case Against Neo-Territorialism,
95 Tul. L. Rev. 1305 (2021)); Zoe Niesel, #PersonalJurisdiction: A New
Age of Internet Contacts, 94 Ind. L.J. 103 (2019); Todd David Peterson,
Categorical Confusion in Personal Jurisdiction Law, 76 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 655 (2019); Robert E. Pfeffer, A 21st Century Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction, 13 U.N.H. L. Rev. 65 (2015).

32.

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1036, n.2 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1255).

33.

Aside from Professor Sachs’s article, see generally Patrick J. Borchers,
The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From
Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 19 (1990)
[hereinafter Borchers, Constitutional Law] (arguing that Pennoyer can
plausibly be read as invoking the Due Process Clause only to ensure that
state courts followed state law of jurisdiction); Jay Conison, What Does
Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 Rutgers L. Rev. 1071
(1994) (arguing that state-court jurisdiction should not be closely
regulated by the Due Process Clause); John N. Drobak, The Federalism
Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 1015, 1029–31 (1983)
(explaining that Pennoyer did not necessarily enshrine territorial
principles as a matter of due process); Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin,

50

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Ford and “Corporate Tag Jurisdiction” in the Pennoyer Era

I. Justice Gorsuch’s Concurrence in the Judgment
In Ford, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in
the judgment, finding Ford Motor Company subject to jurisdiction in
the forum states.34 The second part of his opinion focused on the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment and its intended
limitations (if any) on jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations.35
Justice Gorsuch wondered why current law allows tag jurisdiction over
individuals, but probably not corporations, although it once did in some
circumstances.36
Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and
Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 479, 505 (1987) (noting that
Pennoyer “strongly suggests that the due process clause is not itself the
source of personal jurisdiction principles”); Martin H. Redish, Due
Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical
Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1112 (1981); Roger H. Trangsrud, The
Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
849, 876 (1989) (“Justice Field did not contend, nor could he, that the
Due Process Clause was the source of the territorial rules of jurisdiction
he articulated.”); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of
Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 Va. L. Rev.
169, 171 (2004) (“The Court has forgotten that the territorially based
limitations that it imposes on state court authority, ostensibly under the
authority of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, are
in fact direct descendants of federal common law limitations long
predating that Amendment.”); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional
Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative
Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses
(Part One), 14 Creighton L. Rev. 499 (1981) (providing an exhaustive
review of due-process and full-faith-and-credit law). Not everyone agrees
with this, however. Professor Oakley devoted 163 pages to arguing that
my limited view of Pennoyer was a mirage and that Pennoyer could only
be understood as the Court now understands it, which is that it imposed
jurisdictional restraints directly on state courts. See John B. Oakley, The
Pitfalls of “Hint and Run” History: A Critique of Professor Borchers’s
“Limited View” of Pennoyer v. Neff, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 591 (1995).
I replied, pointing to contemporaneous commentary and state cases
adopting the limited view of Pennoyer. See Patrick J. Borchers,
Pennoyer’s Limited Legacy: A Reply to Professor Oakley, 29 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 115 (1995) [hereinafter Borchers, Limited Legacy].
34.

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1036 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

35.

Id. at 1036–37 (noting tag jurisdiction over individuals (citing Pa. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95–96 (1917))).

36.

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1036 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). He
also noted that the old implied-consent and presence fictions regarding
corporate jurisdiction were not so different from more modern cases. Id.
at 1038. In some respects, the old fictions were at least as forgiving to
plaintiffs as modern applications of the minimum-contacts test. See
Borchers, Twilight, supra note 31, at 3; Jacobs, supra note 31 (noting that
some modern litigants would have had a better chance of establishing
jurisdiction a century ago).
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Early in his concurrence, Gorsuch described the “old guardrails” of
the minimum contacts test as “look[ing] a little battered.”37 After
critiquing the majority’s minimum-contacts analysis, he suggested, “it’s
hard not to ask how we got here and where we might be headed.”38
Justice Gorsuch began by observing that, pre-International Shoe, “it
seems due process was usually understood to guarantee that only a
court of competent jurisdiction could deprive a defendant of his life,
liberty, or property.”39
By “competent jurisdiction” Justice Gorsuch presumably meant a
court having both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, though his
emphasis was on the former. However, competence is a commonly used
term for subject-matter jurisdiction40 and Pennoyer—in its famous dueprocess paragraph—cited personal and subject-matter jurisdiction
cases.41 The concurrence continued: “In turn, a court’s competency
normally depended on the defendant’s presence in, or consent to, the
sovereign’s jurisdiction.”42
Pausing here to consider these two critical sentences, Justice
Gorsuch must mean that, pre-International Shoe, the Due Process
Clause was not universally understood to require states to adhere to
any particular jurisdictional regime. Otherwise, his use of “normally”
would make no sense. State courts don’t just “normally” follow
constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme Court; ever since
the Supreme Court declared itself the final arbiter of the meaning of
the Constitution, states must adhere to its decisions.43 For instance,
when the Supreme Court announced a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage, it became the rule in all fifty states, regardless of what state
law might say.44
37.

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

38.

Id. at 1036.

39.

Id. (emphasis added).

40.

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of L. § 97 (Am. L. Inst. 1971).

41.

See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878); Perdue, supra note 33, at
505–06 (noting that Pennoyer’s due process passage referenced both
personal- and subject-matter-jurisdiction cases).

42.

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1036 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment)
(emphasis added).

43.

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803); see also
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).

44.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 680–81 (2015). At least one local
official initially refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, but
doing so earned her a trip to jail and caused her to be terminated from
her job. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Will Not Hear Kim
Davis Same-Sex Marriage Case, Wash. Post (Oct. 5, 2020, 1:40 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-courtkim-davis-same-sex-marriage/2020/10/05/cd5a74d2-0710-11eb-9be6-
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In an important article cited by Justice Gorsuch, Professor Sachs
argues that Pennoyer’s invocation of the Due Process Clause gave
defendants the constitutional right to enforce the general law of
jurisdiction on direct—not just collateral—attack, but due process did
not create jurisdictional rules.45 By general law he means the law—
drawn from English common law, customary international law, and
other sources—that federal courts heavily participated in developing
prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.46 In a 1990 article, I advanced
a related thesis.47 I argued that Pennoyer is open to a “limited”
interpretation.48 Under this limited view of Pennoyer, due process
guaranteed a defendant a chance to challenge state-court jurisdiction
under state law.49 I suggested that it would be practically wiser, and
doctrinally sound, if the Court would pull back due process to invalidate
state-court assertions of jurisdiction only if the forum choice put the
defendant at a practical disadvantage in defending the case.50
Professor Sachs and I are not the first to venture into this territory.
Important scholarship has dug deep into the origins of the Due Process
cf25fb429f1a_story.html [https://perma.cc/U4LL-9CS3] (recounting the saga
of Kim Davis, a Kentucky clerk who refused to issue same-sex marriage
licenses and was briefly jailed and defeated for re-election).
45.

See Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1253–55, cited with approval in
Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1036 n.2 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment)
(noting that recent scholarship is asking the “right question” about
personal jurisdiction—“what the Constitution as originally understood
requires, not what nine judges consider ‘fair’ and ‘just’”).

46.

304 U.S. 64 (1938), examined in Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1255
(“The idea of general law, and our sense of its place in our federal system,
has fallen somewhat out of fashion since [Erie].”)). See also id. at 1252.
Professor Sachs often uses the phrase “jurisdiction, full stop” to refer to
jurisdiction under the judgment-rendering court’s law. Id. at 1253. This
was often defined by the general law of jurisdiction (and always defined
that way in federal courts) but also could be defined by state law where
it provided the jurisdictional rule. Id. at 1299.

47.

Borchers, Constitutional Law, supra note 33, at 40–43.

48.

Id.

49.

Id. at 40.

50.

Id. at 94. This is one way to understand the banter between the majority
opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence over the “duck decoy”
hypothetical. For a description of a duck decoy, see infra note 64. In this
hypothetical, a Maine retiree carves decoys for duck hunting and sells a
few over the Internet. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028 n.4. Both the majority and
the concurrence agreed that the retiree ought not be subject to jurisdiction
in a faraway state if one of the decoys causes injury to a purchaser, but
debated whether that result could be justified in a principled fashion
under the minimum-contacts test. Compare id. (majority opinion), with
id. at 1035 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). A principal
difference between Ford and the retiree is that Ford is at no disadvantage
defending in the injury state, while the retiree likely would be.

53

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Ford and “Corporate Tag Jurisdiction” in the Pennoyer Era

Clause and come away with serious questions as to the historical
soundness of constitutionalized state-court jurisdiction, at least in its
current form.51 Though different consequences flow from differing
assessments of the historical record, for the moment we can remain
agnostic as to the soundness of the varying interpretations of Pennoyer
and the Fourteenth Amendment, except to stipulate that the Due
Process Clause—as originally understood—quite likely did not itself
supply jurisdictional rules, but rather was a mechanism for enforcing
rules that came from elsewhere.52 Justice Gorsuch—as discussed more
fully below—understands that the conventional notion that Pennoyer
converted personal jurisdiction to a constitutionalized subject (with the
Due Process Clause supposedly guarding against state-court
overreaches) is a gross oversimplification.
As Justice Gorsuch noted, the minimum-contacts test came after
jurisdictional law drifted far from its historical home and emerged as
an attempt to unify corporate jurisdiction.53 As corporations rose in
importance in the national economy, courts tried to squeeze them into
one of two jurisdictional fictions: either that the corporation did enough
business in the forum state to render it present and amenable to
jurisdiction, or that the forum state had extracted the corporation’s
“consent” to jurisdiction as a condition of doing business.54
International Shoe brought the presence and consent fictions under
the single banner of “fair play and substantial justice.”55 But in so
doing, International Shoe baked in the advantages that corporations
gained in prior decades by being able to do some business while evading
jurisdiction in the forum state.56 Moreover, as Justice Gorsuch noted,
unifying the presence and consent theories deprived states of one of
their most important methods of protecting their citizens: requiring
jurisdictional consent as a condition of doing business in the forum
state.57
Justice Black, in his now-mostly-forgotten International Shoe
separate opinion (which today would be a concurrence in the
judgment), warned of this.58 Justice Black, like Justice Gorsuch, was a

51.

See supra note 33.

52.

Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1252–53.

53.

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1037 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

54.

Id. at 1036–37.

55.

See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also
Borchers, Muddy-Booted, supra note 28, at 23.

56.

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1037–38 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

57.

Id. at 1037.

58.

Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 323 (opinion of Black, J.).
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textualist.59 He noted the “emotional appeal” of terms like fair play, but
could find no root for them in the Due Process Clause.60 Justice Black
argued that “it is unthinkable that the vague due process clause was
ever intended to prohibit a State from regulating or taxing a business
carried on within its boundaries simply because this is done by agents
of a corporation organized and having its headquarters elsewhere.”61 His
opinion concluded, “I believe that the Federal Constitution leaves to
each State, without any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts,’ a power to . . . open the doors of
its courts for its citizens to sue corporations whose agents do business
in those States.”62
The echo of Justice Black’s opinion is audible in Justice Gorusch’s
concurrence when the latter suggested that maybe “International Shoe
just doesn’t work quite as well as it once did.”63 He agreed that for a
time the minimum contacts test sufficed as a substitute for corporate
presence, but criticized the majority’s efforts to distinguish the contacts
of Ford Motor Company from a hypothetical retiree making small sales
of duck decoys64 over the Internet (the former subject to jurisdiction
and the latter not).65 To distinguish the two, the majority invoked an
“affiliation” test based on the volume of the contacts, but Justice
Gorsuch dismissed this as a tepid reformulation of International Shoe’s
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” test.66
Referring to the Ford majority opinion, he wrote, “I cannot help
but wonder if we are destined to return where we began.”67 He
hypothesized that the Court is “seeking to recreate in new terms a
jurisprudence about corporate jurisdiction that was developing before
this Court’s muscular interventions in the early 20th century.”68 The
phrase “muscular interventions” is eye-catching. It was in the early 20th
century—1915 to be exact—when the Court first held that due process
59.

See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical
Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 25, 26 (1994).

60.

Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 325 (opinion of Black, J.).

61.

Id. at 323.

62.

Id. at 324.

63.

Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1038
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

64.

Duck decoys are inanimate and look like ducks. Duck hunters float them
in water to fool live ducks into thinking that they are in a safe area.
Lauren Drapes, Object History: A Duck Decoy, Univ. of Wis.-Madison:
Wis. 101; Our Hist. in Objects (Sept. 9, 2020), https://wi101.wisc.edu/
2020/09/09/object-history-a-duck-decoy/ [https://perma.cc/9EQ2-N9SM].

65.

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1038 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

66.

Id.

67.

Id.

68.

Id. at 1039.
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itself limited state-court assertions of jurisdiction.69 While noting that
International Shoe strove to move past the presence and consent
fictions, Justice Gorsuch remarked that “maybe all we have done since
is struggle for new words to express the old ideas.”70
Justice Gorsuch penned two crucial footnotes on the original
understanding of the Due Process Clause. In the first, citing Professor
Sachs’s article, he noted scholarship concluding that due process does
not itself supply jurisdictional rules.71 Without weighing in on the
correctness of the various theories, he stated “they at least seek to
answer the right question—what the Constitution as originally
understood requires, not what nine judges consider ‘fair’ and ‘just.’”72
Then, in a testy response to the majority’s insinuation that he would
return us to the horse-and-buggy era,73 he wrote:
The majority worries that the thoughts expressed here threaten
to “transfigure our specific jurisdiction standard as applied to
corporations” and “return [us] to the mid-19th century.” But it
has become a tired trope to criticize any reference to the
Constitution’s original meaning as (somehow) both radical and
antiquated. Seeking to understand the Constitution’s original
meaning is part of our job. What’s the majority’s real worry
anyway—that corporations might lose special protections? The
Constitution has always allowed suits against individuals on any
issue in any State where they set foot. Yet the majority seems to
recoil at even entertaining the possibility the Constitution might
tolerate similar results for “nationwide corporation[s],” whose
“business is everywhere.”74

One need not subscribe to a full-blown originalist theory of
constitutional interpretation to accept the relevance of the history of
jurisdiction pre-International Shoe. Jurisdictional due process is a
doctrinal orphan separated from the rest of due-process law, and going
back to its origins to figure out why that is so is worthwhile regardless
of one’s preferred mode of construing the Constitution.75 Consider that
Justice Brandeis—hardly an originalist—in Erie Railroad banished
general common law from federal court diversity cases, in part because

69.

See Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 194–
95 (1915).

70.

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1039 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).

71.

Id. at 1036 n.2 (citing Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1255).

72.

Id.

73.

See id. at 1025 n.2 (“[Justice Gorsuch’s] concurrence proposes . . . a return
to the mid-19th century . . . .”).

74.

Id. at 1039 n.5 (citations omitted).

75.

See Borchers, Muddy-Booted, supra note 28, at 22.
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historical research suggested that the then-150-year-old Rules of
Decision Act had been misinterpreted.76
Nor is it fair to insinuate that Justice Gorsuch would put
corporations out of the jurisdictional reach of ordinary citizens. As we
shall see below, pre-Pennoyer and continuing to the early 20th century,
corporations were often easier to reach than now. The “special
protections” for corporations developed after that.77 While International
Shoe tried to bring corporations back within reach, the ever-morphing
minimum-contacts/fair-play test too often put them beyond the grasp
of plaintiffs harmed in their home states by multinational enterprises
exploiting the forum-state’s market.78 If a route exists to redirect
jurisdictional law to avoid such obviously unfair results, it is worth
exploring.

II. Pennoyer and its Mysteries
Parsing for the thousandth time the Delphic and messy Pennoyer
opinion would unnecessarily lengthen this article and be pointless. I
have engaged in two overly long attempts to explain it on its own
terms.79 Others have made heroic efforts.80 Suffice it to say that the
historical record is more complex than the current Court’s boilerplate
recital—that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits
a state court’s power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant”81—
suggests.
To cast the Pennoyer opinion in sharper relief, I invoke a notation
that I have used before.82 Consider the following permutations on a
judgment rendered in State A:

Case
Case
Case
Case

1
2
3
4

F-1
State
State
State
State

F-2
State B
Federal B
Federal A
State A

A
A
A
A

76.

Id. at 72–73, 73 n.5.

77.

See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1037–38, 1039 n.5 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517–18
(1923)).

78.

See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877–79
(2011).

79.

See Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 33, at 118–36; Borchers,
Constitutional Law, supra note 33, at 32–42.

80.

See, e.g., Perdue, supra note 33, at 480–508.

81.

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024.

82.

See Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 33, at 125.
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F-1 is shorthand for the first forum, which is the judgmentrendering court. F-2 is the notation for the court being asked to
recognize F-1’s judgment—or the judgment-recognizing forum. For a
judgment rendered in a state court (in Pennoyer it was an Oregon state
court),83 there are four possible courts in which F-1’s jurisdiction might
be attacked. In Case 1 it’s another state’s court; in Case 2 it’s a federal
court in another state; in Case 3 it’s a federal court located in the same
state; and in Case 4 it’s the same state court. In Case 4, this now usually
takes the form of a direct attack on F-1’s jurisdiction,84 but not always.
A defendant has no constitutional right to make an appearance without
submitting to F-1’s jurisdiction, leaving a collateral attack the only
option if no direct challenge is available.85 Moreover, a defendant might
not get notice of the suit in F-1, leaving the only route to impeach the
judgment a collateral attack in F-1.86
Prior to Pennoyer (1878) and the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment (1868), the law was settled in Cases 1 and 2.87 Early on,
the Supreme Court held state-court judgments exceeding the limits of
the general law of jurisdiction did not have to be recognized by another
state’s courts or by a federal court situated in another state.88 However,
nothing prevented F-1’s courts from executing the judgment against
assets located in State A.89 A good example is New York’s “joint
debtors” rule, which allowed jurisdiction over all partners and the
partnership, even if only one partner was served in New York.90 The
Supreme Court held the New York rule to be beyond the limits of the
83.

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 719 (1878).

84.

See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (allowing a direct attack on personal
jurisdiction).

85.

See York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15, 16–21 (1890) (holding that a Texas rule
requiring a defendant to submit to state-court jurisdiction “if he asks the
court to determine any question, even that of service” did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment).

86.

See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 224–25 (2006) (holding that
failed efforts at notifying the property owner of the tax sale allowed the
owner to collaterally attack the judicial sale in F-1); Peralta v. Heights
Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 81–82, 84–86 (1988) (holding that it is
unconstitutional to require a meritorious defense to the underlying action
in order to set aside default judgment based on defective service).

87.

See Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 33, at 125–27.

88.

See, e.g., Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 483–84 (1813)
(interpreting Full Faith and Credit Clause to alter rule that foreign
judgments were merely evidentiary).

89.

See D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 173–74 (1850) (pointing
out that only “foreign State[s]”—states other than the state that issued
the judgment—did not have to enforce the originating state’s judgment if
the defendant had not been served with process).

90.

Id. at 173.
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general law of jurisdiction, meaning that other states need not enforce
the judgment, but nothing prevented the New York courts from enforcing the judgment against the New York assets of the partnership.91
Although now unfamiliar in domestic litigation, this is the internationally recognized difference between direct and indirect limitations
on jurisdiction. A direct limitation prohibits F-1 from rendering a
judgment beyond jurisdictional bounds; an indirect limitation allows F2 to refuse to recognize F-1’s judgment that reaches too far.92 The latter
arose at the time of Pennoyer (and before)93 and persists today. For
example, in Schibsby v. Westenholz,94 decided by the Queen’s Bench
roughly contemporaneously to Pennoyer, F-1 was a French court. The
French court asserted jurisdiction under a famously exorbitant rule
giving a French court jurisdiction if the plaintiff was French, even
without any other connection to France.95 The plaintiff obtained a
judgment in France and attempted to enforce it in England.96 The
English court refused because the French court did not have jurisdiction
under accepted norms of international law.97
In the European Union, the Brussels Regulations (and the
Conventions that preceded them) act as both direct and indirect
limitations on jurisdiction.98 Member States agree not to take
jurisdiction against defendants from other Member States except on
agreed-upon jurisdictional bases. Member States also agree not to
enforce judgments not rendered on those bases.99
The relationship between states of the United States—as late as the
early-20th century—resembled European nations pre-Brussels. States
sometimes had jurisdictional statutes or created common-law rules that
91.

Id. at 174–76.

92.

See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral
Convention: The Lessons of the Due Process Clause and the Brussels
Convention, 24 Brook. J. Int’l L. 125, 128 & n.4 (1998).

93.

See, e.g., Buchanan v. Rucker (1808) 103 Eng. Rep. 546, 546–47 (KB)
(posting of summons at courthouse on the island of Tobago insufficient
notice to allow judgment to be recognized by English courts).

94.

(1870) 6 L.R. 155 (QB).

95.

Adrian Briggs, Which Foreign Judgments Should We Recognise Today?,
36 Int’l & Compar. L.Q. 240, 240–41 (1987) (discussing Schibsby).

96.

Id. at 241.

97.

Id.

98.

See Peter Hay, Patrick J. Borchers, Symeon C. Symeonides &
Christopher A. Whytock, Conflict of Laws 120 n.785, 122 & n.792,
124 (6th ed. 2018) (discussing generally the development of the Brussels
Conventions and Regulations); Brand, supra note 92, at 127–28, 127 n.4.

99.

Hay et al., supra note 98 at 122 & n.792 (citing Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial
Matters (EC), 1990 O.J. (C 189) 2).
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allowed jurisdiction beyond the general-law boundaries.100 The risk to
the holder of such a judgment came not in the inability to enforce it
within the forum-state’s territory; it was in exporting it to another
state.101
Pennoyer was different because it was a Case 3. F-1 in Pennoyer
was an Oregon state court, which asserted jurisdiction over Neff’s land,
resulting in the luckless Sylvester Pennoyer holding the sheriff’s deed
to it.102 F-2 was an Oregon federal court sitting in diversity in which
Neff brought a trespass action against Pennoyer, attacking the sheriff’s
deed as void because the Oregon state court (F-1) had no jurisdiction.103
The Supreme Court agreed with Neff because the land had not been
attached before the Oregon state court rendered judgment, and
therefore the court did not have in rem jurisdiction.104 The majority did
not clearly explain what law it applied to determine that the Oregon
state court lacked jurisdiction. Early in the opinion, the Court discussed
a provision in the Oregon Code that codified the general law of
jurisdiction.105 The Court said that—so construed—the Oregon Code
recited “general, if not universal” principles of jurisdiction.106 An
unambiguous holding of Pennoyer is that under the general law of
jurisdiction (either of its own force or as codified in Oregon state law),
in rem jurisdiction requires prejudgment attachment of the property.107
This was not a trivial holding as some state high courts held that

100. See, e.g., Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y. 137, 139 (1881)
(corporate tag statute); Strom v. Mont. Cent. Ry. Co., 84 N.W. 46, 47
(Minn. 1900) (holding action may be maintained against foreign
corporation based upon property in state without need for prejudgment
attachment thereof).
101. See Borchers, Constitutional Law, supra note 33, at 43–49.
102. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 719, 721 (1878). “Luckless” may not be the
right word. Sylvester Pennoyer went on to become the Governor of
Oregon, but used his inauguration speech to decry his loss in the Pennoyer
case. See Perdue, supra note 33, at 488–89. Maybe “embittered” is a better
word.
103. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719–22. Strictly speaking, Neff’s suit might be better
described as a quiet-title action, but for our purposes nothing turns on
this.
104. Id. at 727–28.
105. Id. at 720.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 727–28.
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prejudgment attachment was not necessary108 and the Pennoyer dissent
took the same position.109
The Constitution arose only late in the majority opinion. The
majority first invoked the Full Faith and Credit Clause.110 The Supreme
Court had confronted Cases 3 before Pennoyer, but disposed of them
by holding F-1’s jurisdictional law did not authorize the judgment, thus
avoiding the question of whether a federal court sitting in the same
state could deny recognition to a neighboring state court’s judgment
under the general law of jurisdiction.111 But the Pennoyer Court
extended the full-faith-and-credit principles of Cases 1 and 2 to Cases
3. Pennoyer’s clearest constitutional holding is based on this
interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Court extends
the principles of Cases 1 and 2 to Cases 3 in the following passage:
[T]he courts of the United States are not required to give effect
to judgments of this character when any right is claimed under
them. Whilst they are not foreign tribunals in their relations to
the State courts, they are tribunals of a different sovereignty,
exercising a distinct and independent jurisdiction, and are bound
to give to the judgments of the State courts only the same faith

108. See Jarvis v. Barrett, 14 Wis. 591, 594–95 (1861) (noting that
prejudgment attachment is not required in in rem actions); Strom v.
Mont. Cent. Ry. Co., 84 N.W. 46, 47 (Minn. 1890) (holding action may
be maintained against foreign corporation based upon property in state
without need for prejudgment attachment thereof); Rice, Stix & Co. v.
Peteet, 66 Tex. 568, 569 (1886) (holding pre–judgment attachment not
required for in rem jurisdiction under Texas attachment statute).
109. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 747–48 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 729 (majority opinion).
111. Borchers, Constitutional Law, supra note 33, at 36 n.115. The best
example is Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1873), authored by
Justice Field, who would write the majority opinion in Pennoyer five years
later. Galpin was a Case 3, with F-1 being a California state court and F2 a California federal court. Galpin, however, held that the California
federal court (F-2) need not recognize the state-court judgment because
the state court did not have jurisdiction under state law. Id. at 364, 369,
371, 373. The only role Galpin saw for the general law of jurisdiction
(which I call the “territorial principles”) is that California state law must
be presumed to conform to the general law unless it clearly stated
otherwise under the general principle that statutes are presumed not to
derogate from the common law. Id. at 368–69. Professor Sachs canvasses
the cases I cited and seems to agree that they rested on F-1 not having
jurisdiction under state law, but notes that many of them also addressed
the general law of jurisdiction. See Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1296
n.345. I don’t disagree with his assessment of any of these cases, but
Pennoyer, in my view, was the first case to unambiguously extend full–
faith–and–credit principles to Case 3.
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and credit which the courts of another State are bound to give to
them.112

The “different sovereignty” language is critical. While in prior cases
the Court managed to avoid putting its full weight on full-faith-andcredit principles to decide Cases 3, Pennoyer was a clear command to
federal courts to not recognize jurisdictionally infirm—under either F1’s or the general law113—neighboring state-court judgments. In the
Supreme Court’s view, the Oregon state court overstepped the bounds
of the general law of jurisdiction by allowing an in rem judgment
without prejudgment seizure of Neff’s land, meaning the judgment need
not be recognized by a court of a different sovereignty.114 Thus,
Pennoyer held the lower federal court was correct to rule that Sylvester
Pennoyer was trespassing, because his sheriff’s deed was a nullity.115
This was plenty to make Pennoyer a big case. First, it came down
on the side of requiring pre-judgment attachment of property (usually
land) before exercising in rem jurisdiction. Second, it extended the fullfaith-and-credit reasoning of Cases 1 and 2 to Cases 3. Then came
Pennoyer’s famous due process paragraph:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be
directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted,
on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine
the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that
court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.
Whatever difficulty may be experienced in giving to those terms
a definition which will embrace every permissible exertion of
power affecting private rights, and exclude such as is forbidden,
there can be no doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial
proceedings. They then mean a course of legal proceedings
according to those rules and principles which have been
established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and
enforcement of private rights.116

112. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732–33.
113. I referred to the general law as “general principles of international law”;
“common law [of] the federal courts”; “the general principles of territorial
jurisdiction”; and “the territorial principles.” See Borchers, Constitutional
Law, supra note 33, at 28–32. For ease of reference, here I adopt the term
“general law.”
114. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 731–33.
115. Id. at 719, 734 (“It follows from the views expressed that the personal
judgment recovered in the State court of Oregon against the plaintiff
herein, then a non-resident of the State, was without any validity, and
did not authorize a sale of the property in controversy.”).
116. Id. at 733.
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This paragraph is now conventionally interpreted to mean due
process itself limits state-court jurisdiction. In other words, under the
conventional view, Pennoyer also addressed Cases 4 (even though
Pennoyer was a Case 3) and made the prejudgment attachment rule
one of constitutional, not just general or state, law.117
To embed this rule in the Due Process Clause would have been a
big leap for the Pennoyer majority. Having resolved the case under fullfaith-and-credit principles, “fix[ing] in constitutional amber” the general
law of jurisdiction via due process would be unnecessary to the result.118
It also presented a timing conundrum. When the Court referred to
“such judgments” it meant the Oregon state court judgment, rendered
in 1866—two years before the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment.119 Nonetheless, the conventional view is that Pennoyer did
exactly that—fully constitutionalize the rules of jurisdiction.
But Pennoyer need not be read so broadly. Professor Sachs calls on
courts and scholars “to abandon what many see as the main holding of
Pennoyer: that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause . . . imposes rules for personal jurisdiction.”120 He proposes a
“sympathetic reconstruction” of Pennoyer.121 Instead of the rules of
personal jurisdiction being constitutionalized, they are “a matter of
general law—that unwritten law, including much of the English
common law and the customary law of nations, that formed the basis
of the American legal system and that continues to govern unusual
corners of the system today.”122 According to Professor Sachs, the rules
of personal jurisdiction come not from the due process itself; they come
from the more mutable general law. He puts it this way: “Reading
Pennoyer as requiring jurisdiction, full stop, makes more sense than
reading it to treat any particular service rules as written in stone.”123
Thus, in his view, due process creates a federal right to have the
judgment rendered by a court having “jurisdiction, full stop”124 (with
those “full stop” jurisdictional rules coming not from due process),
including enforcement by direct review in the Supreme Court.125 In his
view, the Due Process Clause gave the Supreme Court authority to
reverse on direct review any state-court assertion of jurisdiction beyond
117. See Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 33, at 119–20.
118. Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1255.
119. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719; Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 33, at 132
& n.77.
120. See Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1252.
121. Id. at 1289.
122. Id. at 1252.
123. Id. at 1300.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1301–06.
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the boundaries of the general law.126 Pennoyer, he says, gave the
Supreme Court this authority because failing to follow the general law
was a due-process violation and created a federal issue giving the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, thus creating a strong incentive
for state courts to “get with the program” (so to speak) in their
understanding of the general law.127
My “sympathetic reconstruction” of Pennoyer is what I call the
“limited view” of the opinion.128 I formulated the limited view in 1990:
[T]he due process clause . . . provide[s] an avenue for challenging
a [court]’s exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . but [does not] . . .
dictate the . . . rules of [personal] jurisdiction. Put another
way, . . . defendants [must] have at least one chance to ensure
that a state followed its own rules of jurisdiction, whatever those
rules might be.129

The limited view joins Professor Sachs (and some other commentators
before us)130 in asserting that the Due Process Clause provides a vehicle
for enforcing jurisdictional rules, but that those rules come from
somewhere else. The difference is that Professor Sachs says “somewhere
else” is general law,131 whereas I think it is state law.132
However, in Pennoyer, whether “somewhere else” was general or
state law didn’t make any difference. In Pennoyer, the majority
construed Section 55 of the Oregon Code133 to embrace principles of
“general, if not universal” law.134 This was the only sensible
interpretation of the Oregon statute. The statute declared that a
defendant is subject to jurisdiction only if “he appear in the court, or
be found within the State, or be a resident thereof, or have property
therein; and in the last case [limiting the judgment to the attached
126. Id. at 1306–07.
127. Id. at 1306 (“Due process requires that state courts have jurisdiction, full
stop, which federal courts will assess based on their own view of the
general law.”). See also id. at 1307 (“After the Fourteenth Amendment,
though, a case in state court could be taken to the Supreme Court, on a
claim that the underlying judgment lacked personal jurisdiction and so
threatened a deprivation without due process. The specific standards to
be applied were still drawn from general law . . . .”).
128. Borchers, Constitutional Law, supra note 33, at 40.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 33.
131. Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1307 (noting that in reviewing statecourt assertions of jurisdiction, “[t]he specific standards to be applied were
still drawn from general law”).
132. Borchers, Constitutional Law, supra note 33, at 40–41.
133. Or. Code Civ. Proc. § 55 (1874).
134. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878).
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property].”135 The Oregon Code thus resembles the—perhaps
unnecessary—state statutes purporting to receive the common law as
of the date of the Declaration of Independence.136 Therefore, on the facts
of Pennoyer, one cannot say whether the Supreme Court was declaring
the Oregon state-court judgment void under general law or Oregon
state law—they were identical.
An important consequence of the limited view is that states could
pass statutes (or adopt common-law rules) exceeding the bounds of the
general law of jurisdiction, because due process did not render them
unconstitutional. Judgments so rendered were vulnerable to collateral
attack in any court of a different sovereignty because of Pennoyer’s
extension of full-faith-and-credit principles to Cases 3, but those
judgments could still be enforced in the forum state, as long as the state
court followed state jurisdictional law.137
Some commentators, including Professor Sachs, suggest this would
lead to judgment debtors racing to federal court in the forum state to
attempt to undo the state-court judgment.138 Although this might have
happened occasionally,139 it required a basis for subject-matter
jurisdiction for the federal-court attack, with diversity of citizenship
being the only candidate.140 This requires full diversity of the parties
and a judgment meeting the amount in controversy, conditions not
always met after the liberal joinder rules ushered in by the (David
Dudley) Field Code of 1848.141
135. Id. at 720 (quotations omitted).
136. See Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1262.
137. Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 33, at 130.
138. See Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1297 (“Why didn’t more out-ofstate defendants . . . just default in the state court and then sue the
winner right back in federal court . . . ?”). See also Oakley, supra note
33, at 630 (arguing that collateral attacks on state court judgments
“would inevitably be brought in federal court”). For a response, see
Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 33, at 122–23 (noting the limitations
of subject-matter jurisdiction and the practical difficulties in recovering
personal property sold to satisfy a judgment).
139. Cf. Flower v. Parker, 9 F. Cas. 323 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass.
1823) (No. 4891) (resolving a challenge to a default judgment rendered by
a Massachusetts state court).
140. Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 33, at 122–23, 122 n.34.
141. Id. See also Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute:
Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal
Rules, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1989) (“The Code, for example, merged
law and equity, abolished the common-law forms of action and extended
the more liberal joinder and pleading rules of equity practice to suits at
law.” (citing An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and
Proceedings of the Courts of this State, ch. 379, §§ 62, 91–102, 118–52,
1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 510, 515–16, 521–26 (1848).)). David Dudley Field
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Moreover, even if a federal-court attack were a theoretical
possibility, defendants with significant assets in the forum state had a
strong incentive to appear and defend the case rather than defaulting
and attacking the judgment in federal court. In the time between the
state judgment and a possible counter federal decree, fast-moving
judgment creditors could execute on the state judgment, making the
practicalities of recovering the property a significant enough burden to
outweigh the benefit of potentially affecting forum choice. “Possession
is nine-tenths of the law.”142
As it turned out, the state that was the commercial center of the
Nation—New York—authorized broad corporate jurisdiction. An
Empire State statute—consistent with a limited view of Pennoyer—
created corporate jurisdiction far beyond the bounds of the general law.
And the New York courts took a devil-may-care attitude as to the
extraterritorial effect of the judgments it enabled.

III. New York’s Pope Rule and Corporate Tag
Jurisdiction
I have several reasons for focusing on New York’s Pope143 rule.144
First, it clearly exceeded the bounds of general-jurisdictional law.145
Second, as the commercial center of the United States, New York’s
was the brother of the author of Pennoyer, then-Justice Steven Field. See
Mark L. Tuft, For Your Eyes Only, 25 L.A. Law. 26, 27 & n.13 (2002).
142. See United States v. Balt. Museum of Art (In re “Paysage Bords de
Seine,” 1879 Unsigned Oil Painting on Linen by Pierre-Auguste Renoir),
991 F. Supp. 2d 740, 743 (E.D. Va. 2014) (quoting Willcox v. Stroup, 467
F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 2006) (determining the ownership of Civil Warera documents)). The adage, however, is ancient. See, e.g., Corporation
of Kingston upon Hull v. Horner, (1790) 98 Eng. Rep. 807, 815; Lofft 576,
591 (Lord Mansfield). It reflects the reality that whatever the claim of
ownership might be, the person in possession of property has a significant
advantage, court order to the contrary or not. A legendary American
demonstration of this is the Hatfield-McCoy dispute, which began in 1878
over the ownership of a single hog. See The Hatfield & McCoy Feud,
History, https://www.history.com/shows/hatfields-and-mccoys/articles/
the-hatfield-mccoy-feud [https://perma.cc/9DL8-5NHB] (last visited Oct.
22, 2021).
143. See Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y. 137 (1881).
144. This discussion of Pope and related cases is a refined reprise of my 1995
treatment of this line of cases. See Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note
33, at 138–48.
145. Compare Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 406–09 (authorizing
business corporate tag jurisdiction only when a corporation “act[s]” in
another state “for the purposes of making contracts there”), with Pope,
87 N.Y. at 139, 141 (authorizing casual corporate tag jurisdiction over a
corporation that “transacted no business” in the state). See also Borchers,
Limited Legacy, supra note 33, at 139.
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corporate law was of enormous import. Third, nearly four decades of
interplay between the New York Court of Appeals (New York’s high
court) and the United States Supreme Court revealed the latter’s
cautious approach to state law on corporate tag jurisdiction. Fourth
(the importance of which is explained below146), New York’s Pope rule
rested on a state statute, not the general law. Finally, the New York
Court of Appeals—in part due to the quality of its personnel (it would
be Judge Cardozo who interred the Pope rule) and in part due to the
state’s importance—was the most influential state court in the
country.147
A.

Pope in New York

In Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Manufacturing Co.,148 New York
plaintiffs sued an Indiana corporation in a New York state court by
serving the defendant-corporation’s president while in New York “on
his way to a seaside resort, and not in his official capacity or upon any
business of the defendant.”149 The defendant corporation “had no place
of business, and transacted no business, and had no property within
this State . . . .”150 Despite lacking any other connection to the forum
state, New York’s high court upheld jurisdiction under New York Code
of Civil Procedure Section 432, which authorized service on “the
president, secretary or treasurer” of a corporation.151
The court read Section 432 as a corporate long-arm statute.152 This
was a natural—in fact the only plausible—reading of the statute. While
Section 432 allowed, without limitation, service on the president,
secretary, or treasurer of the corporation, Section 432’s third
subdivision provided a fallback method of service if none of those
officers could be found in New York.153 That subdivision allowed service
146. See infra notes 250–72 and accompanying text.
147. Judge Posner described the period leading up to Cardozo’s 1916
appointment to the New York Court of Appeals: “In part reflecting New
York’s commercial preeminence, in part the quality of its personnel, the
New York Court of Appeals was the nation’s most distinguished common
law tribunal . . . .” Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in
Reputation 3 (1990).
148. 87 N.Y. 137 (1881).
149. Id. at 139.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 140; Code of Civil Procedure § 432, [1877] 2 N.Y. Laws 1, 144–45.
152. Pre-Pennoyer cases also so interpreted Section 432 to allow casual
corporate tag jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hiller v. Burlington & Mo. River R.R.
Co., 70 N.Y. 223, 225, 228 (1877) (upholding service on corporation
though officer was “temporarily in this State in the pursuit of his own
business”).
153. Pope, 87 N.Y. at 140; Code of Civil Procedure § 432.

67

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Ford and “Corporate Tag Jurisdiction” in the Pennoyer Era

to “the cashier, a director, or the managing agent of the corporation.”154
But for that fallback service to be employed, Section 432 required that
“either the cause of action must have arisen within the State or the
corporation must have property within the State.”155 The absence of
this requirement in the other subdivisions led the Court of Appeals to
conclude that the New York legislature meant to authorize casual
corporate tag jurisdiction if a sufficiently important corporate officer
could be served in-state.156
The defendant’s counsel cited Pennoyer (decided three years before
Pope) in his argument for denying jurisdiction,157 but the New York
high court’s rejoinder was that Pennoyer’s approved jurisdictional bases
mattered only if judgment recognition was sought elsewhere.158 The New
York Court of Appeals denied that any serious constitutional issue was
raised. The court stated: “It has never been doubted that the legislature
could constitutionally authorize the commencement of such an
action.”159 The court noted that the judgment was good in New York
and “[i]ts effect elsewhere need not now be determined.”160
No clearer adoption of Pennoyer’s limited view is possible. On
direct attack of the judgment, the Court of Appeals saw no
constitutional issue. It recognized that the plaintiffs could perhaps
enforce the judgment only in New York and conformity with the general
law would arise only if the judgment creditors went elsewhere.161
Moreover, Pope engaged in a fundamentally different project than the
Pennoyer majority’s reckoning of the Oregon state court’s reach.
154. Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 31 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 238, 239 (N.Y.
Gen. Term) (paraphrasing Code of Civil Procedure § 432(3)), aff’d, 87
N.Y. 137 (1881).
155. Pope, 87 N.Y. at 140. For a later Court of Appeals case considering
whether subdivision three of Section 432 was satisfied, see Tuchband v.
Chi. & Alton R.R. Co., 115 N.Y. 437 (1885).
156. See Pope, 87 N.Y. at 140–41 (noting that an officer has a duty to notify
his corporation of lawsuits against it if the officer learns of the suit).
Section 432 also went unamended by the legislature for several decades,
suggesting that the New York legislature agreed with Pope. See, e.g.,
Sunrise Lumber Co. v. Homer D. Biery Lumber Co., 185 N.Y.S. 711, 712
(App. Div. 1921) (applying Section 432 in the same manner as Pope,
decided 40 years earlier). Section 432 was ultimately repealed in 1920.
Civil Practice Act of 1920, ch. 925, § 1539, [1920] 4 N.Y. Laws 19, 521
(repealing the 1876 Code of Civil Procedure, ch. 448, [1876] 2 N.Y. Laws 1).
157. Pope, 87 N.Y. at 137–38. “Neff” is misspelled as “Nett” in the Reporter’s
summary of counsels’ citations, but the citation leaves no doubt that it is
a reference to Pennoyer.
158. Id. at 141.
159. Id. at 139–40.
160. Id. at 141.
161. Id.

68

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Ford and “Corporate Tag Jurisdiction” in the Pennoyer Era

Oregon state courts adhered to the general law of jurisdiction,162 but
the New York courts had a clear statutory command otherwise. Swift
v. Tyson163—and many cases before and after it—recognized that a state
statute took a subject out of the general law and localized it.164 Thus,
unless the statute was unconstitutional, the New York courts were
bound to follow it, no matter what violence it did to the general law of
jurisdiction.
Pope authorized casual corporate tag jurisdiction. A parallel rule
applies to individual defendants.165 No matter how brief or personal the
defendant’s stay, service of process confers in personam jurisdiction. So
too, said the Court of Appeals, it should be with corporations and their
officers.166 But recall the distinction between casual and business
corporate tag jurisdiction.167 Business corporate tag jurisdiction would
later be found constitutional in the Supreme Court’s 1917 Pennsylvania
Fire decision, which upheld jurisdiction based on service in the forum
on an appointed corporate agent.168
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, New York courts stuck to
Pope and continued to allow casual corporate tag jurisdiction.169 A
fascinating collision between Pope and federal cases rejecting casual

162. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 719 (1878).
163. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). Swift was not the origin of the distinction between local
and general law, but became the best-known case describing it. See
Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of
Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 Tex.
L. Rev. 79, 114–15 (1993) [hereinafter Borchers, Origins].
164. See Swift, 41 U.S. at 18 (“But, admitting the doctrine to be fully settled
in New York, it remains to be considered, whether it is obligatory upon
this Court, if it differs from the principles established in the general
commercial law. It is observable that the Courts of New York do not
found their decisions upon this point upon any local statute, or positive,
fixed, or ancient local usage: but they deduce the doctrine from the
general principles of commercial law.” (emphasis added)); see also
Borchers, Origins, supra note 163, at 112 (noting that matters of
procedure were considered local law).
165. See Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990).
166. Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y. 137, 137 (1881).
167. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
168. Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. V. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S.
93, 94 (1917).
169. See, e.g., Tuchband v. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co., 115 N.Y. 437, 439–41
(1889); Smith v. W. Pac. Ry. Co., 139 N.Y.S. 129, 135 (App. Div. 1912);
Johnston v. Mut. Rsrv. Life Ins. Co., 93 N.Y.S. 1052, 1058 (App. Div.
1905).
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corporate tag jurisdiction170 came in Grant v. Cananea Consolidated
Copper Co.171
Thorough consideration of this important case begins with the New
York intermediate appellate court’s decision. The first reported decision
in Grant was an opinion by New York’s revered172 First Department of
the Appellate Division.173 The First Department sits in Manhattan, still
today the financial capital of the Nation, and indeed the world.174 Grant,
like Pope, was a casual corporate tag case. The defendant’s president
was served on personal business in New York City; the defendant
corporation had no other substantial connection to New York.175 Special
Term (the trial court) overruled the defendant’s jurisdictional objection
and held, consistent with Pope, that Section 432 conferred
jurisdiction.176 The majority Appellate Division opinion, authored by
Justice Clarke, discussed Pennoyer at length and concluded that the
Pope rule violated the Due Process Clause.177 Justice Ingraham
dissented, taking the limited view of Pennoyer. He began his dissent:
“The question presented on this motion is not whether a judgment
entered in this action is entitled to be enforced as against the defendant
outside the State of New York.”178 The Appellate Division decision
starkly presented the issue of Pennoyer’s breadth to the Court of
Appeals. Both the now-conventional and limited views of Pennoyer
were set forth in the competing lower-court opinions.
The Court of Appeals stuck with Pope (and the limited view) and
reversed the First Department.179 The Court of Appeals followed Pope
because otherwise, in its view, corporations would be treated more

170. See, e.g., Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895).
171. 82 N.E. 191 (N.Y. 1907).
172. Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 33, at 145.
173. See Grant v. Cananea Consol. Copper Co., 102 N.Y.S. 642, 643 (App.
Div.), rev’d, 82 N.E. 191.
174. Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, Supreme Court of New
York, N.Y. Cts. (June 25, 2021), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad1/
[https://perma.cc/DN2N-9KQ9]; see also generally, Duff & Phelps, Global
Regulatory Outlook 2021, Kroll https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/
publications/financial-compliance-regulation/global-regulatory-outlook2021 [https://perma.cc/8YXN-8TA4] (last visited Nov. 30, 2021) (surveying
financial-services senior decision-makers worldwide, the majority of whom
answered that New York City “is the top financial center” in 2021).
175. Grant, 102 N.Y.S. at 643.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 645–46.
178. Id. at 646 (Ingraham, J., dissenting).
179. Grant v. Cananea Consol. Copper Co., 82 N.E. 191, 194 (N.Y. 1907).
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favorably than individuals.180 The unanimous New York Court of
Appeals wrote: “The great business and commercial transactions of our
citizens are now largely conducted through corporations, and no reason
is apparent why foreign corporations should be treated differently from
foreign individuals.”181 The New York high court then observed: “It
must be conceded that . . . the decisions of our own court are not in
entire accord with those of the Supreme Court of the United States.”182
The Court of Appeals rejoined: “While we regret the difference in the
views of the two courts, we recognize the fact that arguments may be
presented in support of either position.”183 The Court of Appeals
considered the argument that the Pope rule violated due process and
said simply, “This we cannot admit.”184
New York’s high court continued to view casual corporate tag
jurisdiction as a matter of state law. If the Due Process Clause limited
state-court reach, New York courts would have been bound by the
United States Supreme Court’s decisions, but the New York courts did
not fall in line. One might discount Grant if it had been a stray opinion
from a little-regarded court. But Grant was of a series of decisions from
the most prestigious state court in the Nation’s commercial center.185
Almost three decades post-Pennoyer, New York’s high court believed
the Due Process Clause did not require dismissal of a case founded on
a casual corporate tag, though the Supreme Court had rejected that
jurisdictional rule as a matter of general law.186 Moreover, the Court of
Appeals answered Justice Gorsuch’s question as to why individuals are
subject to casual tag and corporations not187: corporations should be
subject to casual tag jurisdiction because they ought not receive better
treatment than individuals.188
Three years later, the First Department again confronted the
constitutionality of Pope in Sadler v. Boston and Bolivia Rubber Co.189
The court, citing Pope, noted that “[t]his question [of casual corporate
tag’s validity] is one upon which the decision of the federal courts and
the courts of this state have been in irreconcilable conflict for many

180. Id. at 192.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 193.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Posner, supra note 147, at 3.
186. Grant, 82 N.E. at 192.
187. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1038
(2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
188. Grant, 82 N.E. at 192.
189. 125 N.Y.S. 405, 406 (App. Div. 1910), aff’d, 95 N.E. 1139 (N.Y. 1911).
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years.”190 The corporate defendant pressed Pennoyer and argued that
Supreme Court precedent bound the New York courts. But the First
Department rejected this argument, followed Pope and Grant, and
upheld the service.191 Justice Clarke—who had three years before held
Pope unconstitutional—concurred saying that Grant settled the
question in favor of the limited view.192 The Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion.193 Unsurprisingly, in light of this clear authority, New
York courts continued to adhere to Pope.194
190. Id. (citing Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y. 137 (1881)).
191. Id. at 406–07.
192. Id. at 407–08 (Clarke, J., concurring) (citing Grant, 82 N.E. at 192).
193. See Sadler, 95 N.E. 1139.
194. See, e.g., Mallory v. Va. Hot Springs Co., 141 N.Y.S. 961, 963 (App. Div.
1913) (asserting that action based on corporate tag jurisdiction can
“unquestionably be maintainable”); Smith v. W. Pac. Ry. Co., 139 N.Y.S.
129, 135 (App. Div. 1912) (Clarke, J.) (referring to Pope as “settled law”);
Heney v. Chartered Co., 128 N.Y.S. 436, 438 (Sup. Ct. 1911) (Lehman,
J.) (stating that conflict between state and federal decisions is not over
“whether a foreign corporation is subject to jurisdiction of the court”); see
also Grubel v. Nassauer, 103 N.E. 1113, 1114 (N.Y. 1913) (citing
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878), immediately after stating: “it is settled
that a judgment for money recovered in one state without personal service
of process on the defendant in that state cannot be enforced without the
state.”). Federal courts sitting in New York also noted the divergence
between state and federal authority, but for the most part accepted the
situation calmly. See, e.g., Ostrander v. Deerfield Lumber Co., 206 F. 540,
545 (N.D.N.Y. 1913) (stating that “it is now settled that service on an
officer of a foreign corporation in the state of New York, held good by the
courts of that state under the Code of Civil Procedure, is not necessarily
good under federal law . . .” ); Phelps v. Conn. Co., 188 F. 765, 766–67
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1911) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss and stating,
“This service of the summons and complaint on the defendant under the
decisions of our Court of Appeals was good in the state court. However,
the holdings in the federal courts are the very opposite.” (citations
omitted)); Venner v. Great N.R.R. Co., 153 F. 408, 412 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1907) (referring to jurisdiction in federal trial courts: “such
service . . . confers no such jurisdiction, even though the statutes and
decisions of the highest courts of the state say it does.”), aff’d, 209 U.S.
24 (1908); Lathrop-Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Const. & Imp. Co.,
150 F. 666, 669–70 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1907) (after discussing New York state
court interpretation of Code of Civil Procedure section 432, citing
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714, for the following: “federal courts are the sole judges
of their own jurisdiction, which manifestly is derived from a government
differing from that which clothes the state tribunals with judicial
power.”), rev’d sub nom. Lathrop-Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Const.
& Imp. Co., 215 U.S. 246 (1909); Good Hope Co. v. Ry. Barb Fencing
Co., 22 F. 635, 636–37 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884) (“[S]ervice of process upon an
agent of a foreign corporation while merely casually present in the state
is not equivalent to a personal service upon an individual in conferring
jurisdiction upon a court to render a personal judgment; and such a
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The United States Supreme Court treated Pope delicately. In
Goldey v. Morning News,195 a New York resident filed a state-court libel
action against a Connecticut newspaper.196 The newspaper transacted
no business in New York, but casual service on the president conferred
jurisdiction under Pope.197 The defendant removed the case to the
Eastern District of New York, which dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction.198 On appeal, the Supreme Court noted a “difference of
opinion” between New York courts and federal courts as to casual
corporate tag jurisdiction.199
Goldey invoked the Constitution, but only the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.200 Citing Pennoyer, it stated that “[w]hatever effect a
constructive service may be allowed in the courts of the same
government, it cannot be recognized as valid by the courts of any other
government.”201 The Court continued:
So a judgment rendered in a court of one State, against a
corporation neither incorporated nor doing business within the
State, must be regarded as of no validity in the courts of another
State, or of the United States, unless service of process was made
in the first State upon an agent appointed to act there for the
corporation, and not merely upon an officer or agent residing in
another State, and only casually within the State, and not
charged with any business of the corporation there.202

The Court thus said that the general law of jurisdiction was
relevant only to judgment recognition. Eight years later, in the factually
similar case of Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works,203 the Supreme Court
repeated Goldey’s distinction between courts of the same and different
governments, and again passed on a chance to declare the Pope rule

judgment would be treated as void for want of jurisdiction by other
tribunals than those of the state where it was obtained.”). But see Bentlif
v. London & Colonial Fin. Corp., 44 F. 667, 668 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890)
(suggesting that Pennoyer directly applied to state courts). These
authorities are noted in Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 33, at 147,
n.151.
195. 156 U.S. 518 (1895).
196. Id. at 518.
197. Id. at 518–19.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 520.
200. Id. at 521.
201. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878)).
202. Id. at 521–22 (emphasis added).
203. 190 U.S. 406 (1903).
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unconstitutional.204 Thus, more than three decades after Pennoyer, New
York (and other state205) courts continued to assert casual corporate
tag jurisdiction. Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of Pope in
federal courts, the Court opined only that state-court Pope judgments
risked nonrecognition elsewhere.206
The fatal blow to the Pope rule came indirectly. The North Carolina
courts followed a rule similar to Pope based on their corporate service
statutes.207 In Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee,208 the
Supreme Court ruled, on direct attack, that the North Carolina state
court’s assertion of casual corporate tag jurisdiction violated the Due
Process Clause.209 To my knowledge, Menefee is the first U.S. Supreme
Court opinion to strike down, on due-process grounds and direct attack,
a state-court assertion of personal jurisdiction. Both the direct attack
and due-process aspects are important. A collateral attack left open the
possibility that the judgment would be enforceable in the forum state
and extraterritorial enforcement would bring a full-faith-and-credit
challenge, as intimated by Goldey and Conley.210 In turn, this meant
that the jurisdictional rules need not be embedded in the Due Process
Clause, but might come from somewhere else. But sustaining a direct
attack on due-process grounds could mean only that by reaching too
far the state court violated due process, which has become the
conventional view of Pennoyer.
Menefee is a disingenuous opinion. The Court discussed Saint Clair
v. Cox211 as if it were dispositive, but in that case the forum was a
federal court that adhered to the general law of jurisdiction, regardless
(at that time) of state law.212 From there, the Court reasoned that
204. Id. at 410–11.
205. See infra notes 222–37 and accompanying text.
206. Id. For an example of a case agreeing that New York had jurisdiction
under Pope, but refusing to enforce it under full-faith-and-credit
principles, see Hochstein v. James W. Hill Co., 82 A. 171, 172–73 (N.H.
1912).
207. See infra notes 222–31 and accompanying text.
208. 237 U.S. 189 (1915).
209. Id. at 193 (“[W]ell settled is it that the courts of one State cannot without
a violation of the due process clause, extend their authority beyond their
jurisdiction so as to condemn the resident of another State when neither
his person nor his property is within the jurisdiction of the court rendering
the judgment, since that doctrine was long ago established by the decision
in Pennoyer v. Neff . . . .” (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), and cases
applying Pennoyer).
210. See supra notes 195–206 and accompanying text.
211. 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
212. Menefee, 237 U.S. at 194–95 (addressing St. Clair, 106 U.S. 350); see
Sachs, Pennoyer supra note 3, at 1270.

74

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Ford and “Corporate Tag Jurisdiction” in the Pennoyer Era

casual corporate tag must violate the Due Process Clause because it
had been rejected by Saint Clair.213 But, of course, a federal court is not
a state instrumentality and thus is not subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment.214 The Court attempted to explain away Goldey’s and
Conley’s distinction between the courts of the same and different
governments as being a matter of when the judgment was declared
unenforceable, which is not so—it’s a matter of whether the judgment
is enforceable in the forum state.215 But regardless of its non sequiturs,
Menefee imported the general law of jurisdiction into the Due Process
Clause, sealed it in constitutional amber, and made it applicable on
direct attack to state-court judgments.216
Judge Cardozo presided over Pope’s burial. In Bagdon v.
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,217 service on the corporation
was made pursuant to New York Code of Civil Procedure Section 432.218
Cardozo gently interred Pope without mentioning it by name:
It is true that even the president of a foreign corporation may be
here without bringing the corporation itself within this
jurisdiction. He must be here “officially, representing the
corporation in its business.” Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works,
190 U.S. 406[ (1903)]; Kendall v. American Automatic Loom Co.,
198 U.S. 477[ (1905)]; Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518[
(1895)]. To give judgment in violation of that rule is to condemn
the corporation unheard, and to ignore the essentials of due
process of law. Dicta to the contrary in Grant v. Cananea Consol.
Copper Co., 82 N.E. 191[ (N.Y. 1907)], must yield to the later
decision in Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237
U.S. 189, 192[ (1915)].219

The ever-clever Cardozo, however, managed to nudge the facts to
find that the president was in New York on corporate business, thus
making the assertion of jurisdiction constitutional.220
213. Menefee, 237 U.S. at 194–95.
214. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
215. Menefee, 237 U.S. at 195; see supra notes 197–214 and accompanying
text.
216. Id. at 196–97.
217. 111 N.E. 1075 (N.Y. 1916).
218. Id. at 1077 (citing Code of Civil Procedure § 432, [1877] 2 N.Y. Laws 1,
144–145).
219. Id. (parallel citations omitted).
220. Id. In Aybar v. Aybar, 177 N.E.3d 1257 (N.Y. 2021), the New York Court
of Appeals reinterpreted Bagdon, and the successor to Section 432, as only
authorizing service of process (in the sense of giving notice) and not
conferring general jurisdiction by service on a registered agent. Id. at
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Pope was not forgotten, however. As late as 1927, the First
Department remarked that “[t]he process of receding from the doctrine
of Pope . . . is still going on.”221 The elongated time period is revealing.
It took several decades before the mushy Pennoyer opinion was
dubiously reconstructed to enshrine the Due Process Clause itself as the
source of jurisdictional rules. Below I consider why this delay might
have been. But before doing so, examining Pope’s reception—and
corporate tag jurisdiction (both casual and business) generally—outside
New York is instructive.
B.

Pope and Corporate Tag Jurisdiction Elsewhere

North Carolina had a statute similar to New York’s Section 432.222
One of the many North Carolina decisions construing that statute,
Section 440 of the North Carolina Revised Statutes, was Whitehurst v.
Kerr.223 Although the North Carolina statute was slightly different from
New York’s, for our purposes the differences are immaterial.224 In-state
service “upon the president, treasurer, or secretary” of the corporation
was subject to no statutory limitations.225 However, if a lesser
representative of the corporation were to be served in North Carolina,
it was good service “only when [the corporation] ha[d] property within
this state, or the cause of action arose therein, or when the plaintiff
reside[d] in the state . . . .”226 The opinion’s only oblique reference to
the Constitution was that “principles of natural justice” required that
the person served be a representative of the corporation of sufficient
stature so as to give the defendant notice of the suit.227 Thus, as in
Pope, Whitehurst construed the foreign-corporation-service statute as a
1259–64. The majority repeatedly said that Bagdon has to be understood
in light of its “historical context.” Id. at 1259, 1261, 1263. This was, as
the majority admitted, an effort to avoid the constitutional question of
whether a state can extract corporate consent to jurisdiction through
registration statutes. Id. at 1266. See supra notes 12–16 and
accompanying text. As the dissent convincingly argued, Bagdon was
inarguably a case allowing business corporate tag jurisdiction. Id. at 1271–
1280 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
221. Ray D. Lillibridge, Inc. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 222 N.Y.S. 130, 132 (App.
Div. 1927).
222. N.C. Rev. Stat. § 440 (1905).
223. 68 S.E. 913 (N.C. 1910). North Carolina’s line of cases following Pope’s
reasoning began with Jester v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 42 S.E. 447
(N.C. 1902).
224. Whitehurst, 68 S.E. at 913–14.
225. Id. at 914 (quoting N.C. Rev. Stat. § 440(1)).
226. Id. at 913–14 (quoting N.C. Rev. Stat. § 440(1)).
227. Id. (explaining that a person served must be of a “sufficient character and
rank as to afford reasonable assurance that he will communicate to his
company the fact that process has been served upon him”).
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long-arm statute authorizing casual corporate tag jurisdiction, provided
a sufficiently important officer was served in-state.
The North Carolina case that would be casual corporate tag
jurisdiction’s undoing was Menefee v. Riverside & Dan River Cotton
Mills.228 Menefee was a classic casual corporate tag case as “the
defendant [was] a Virginia corporation and did not have at the
commencement of th[e] action, and ha[d] not [when the court ruled],
any office or place of business in this state, and ha[d] never engaged in
business [t]here . . . .”229 The North Carolina Supreme Court confronted
a due-process challenge to the assertion of jurisdiction, but relying on
Goldey and Conley took the limited view: “the service is sufficient for a
valid judgment at least within our jurisdiction. What opportunity or
method the plaintiff may have to enforce his judgment is not before us
now for consideration.”230 What likely caught the United States
Supreme Court’s attention was the dissent, which urged that the service
was ineffective for any purpose unless the corporate agent “was
transacting business of the corporation or there was some other fact or
circumstance which implied authority to receive service.”231
New York and North Carolina were not the only states to parse
their service statutes to allow jurisdiction over corporations with such
a slight connection to the forum states as to make the assertion of
jurisdiction likely unconstitutional now. Although some decisions
arguably were business corporate tag jurisdiction cases, post-Pennoyer
and pre-Menefee decisions in South Dakota,232 Wisconsin,233 Missouri,234
Michigan,235 Nebraska236 (and likely other states) interpreted their
service statutes as corporate long-arm statutes. Strikingly, neither the
Constitution nor the general law of jurisdiction played any significant
role in the decisions, even though they were decided after Pennoyer.
The pushback against casual corporate tag jurisdiction did not begin in

228. 76 S.E. 741 (N.C. 1913), rev’d, 237 U.S. 189 (1915).
229. Id. at 742.
230. Id. at 743.
231. Id. at 744 (Walker, J., dissenting).
232. See Foster v. Charles Betcher Lumber Co., 58 N.W. 9, 10 (S.D. 1894)
(noting construction of New York statute and that South Dakota’s statute
was modeled on New York’s).
233. See State v. U.S. Mut. Accident Ass’n., 31 N.W. 229, 230–31 (Wis. 1897)
(referring to Pope in its opinion).
234. See McNichol v. U.S. Mercantile Reporting Agency, 74 Mo. 457, 458–59
(1881).
235. See Shickle, Harrison & Howard Iron Co. v. S. L. Wiley Const. Co., 28
N.W. 77, 78 (Mich. 1886).
236. See Klopp v. Creston City Guarantee Water Works Co., 52 N.W. 819,
820–21 (Neb. 1892).
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earnest until the first decade of the 20th century and did not succeed
until the Supreme Court’s 1915 decision in Menefee.237
The pre-Menefee trend of construing corporate-service statutes as
long-arm statutes did not escape the attention of a leading
commentator on corporate law of the time. Seymour Thompson was the
author of a massive multi-volume work on corporate law published in
1895.238 Thompson, referring to the general law and citing Goldey, wrote
that it was a “firmly settled” proposition that service in the forum state
on a corporate officer did not confer jurisdiction over the corporation
unless the corporation was “do[ing] business” there, but “always
provided that the local statute law has not changed the practice.”239
The message could hardly be clearer: Business, but not casual,
corporate tag jurisdiction conformed to the general law, but state
statutes could authorize casual corporate tag jurisdiction without
running afoul of the Constitution.
Where does this leave us? The original understanding of the Due
Process Clause—judging by state-court decisions, the Supreme Court’s
treatment of them, and commentary in the period extending roughly
fifty years from the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification—is that the
Constitution did not invalidate state statutes authorizing casual
corporate tag jurisdiction.240 But those laws are unconstitutional
today.241 Even though Menefee limited states to business corporate tag
jurisdiction,242 even that basis is likely now unconstitutional.243 To
answer Justice Gorsuch’s query, he is correct that the Supreme Court’s
“muscular interventions” on behalf corporate defendants began in the

237. See Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 195-97
(1915).
238. See Seymour D. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Private
Corporations (1896), cited in Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 33
at 160, n.209.
239. Id. § 8030 & n.1.
240. See Borchers, Limited Legacy, supra note 33, at 35, 148 (explaining that
for thirty-seven years after Pennoyer, New York continued to hold the
view that states could pass statutes allowing corporate tag jurisdiction
without violating the Due Process Clause).
241. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011) (explaining that corporate defendants are only subject to
general jurisdiction if “at home” in the forum state).
242. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 191–92,
194–95 (1915); see also, e.g., Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron
Co., 111 N.E. 1075, 1077 (N.Y. 1916).
243. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
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early 20th century244 and were folded into the minimum-contacts test.245
The current constitutional rule that corporations are subject to general
jurisdiction only in the states in which they have their headquarters or
are incorporated is utterly ahistorical and disastrous in practice.246 But
what to do?

IV. Solutions
As I have noted before, the Supreme Court likely “will not roll out
of its proverbial bed tomorrow” and decide to no longer have any say
as to the reach of state courts.247 But that does not mean we need shrug
our collective shoulders and accept fiddling with the minimum-contacts
test as the best we can expect. Consider again corporate tag jurisdiction. At the beginning of the 20th century, the battle front was the
line between casual and business corporate tag.248 Now, early in the 21st
century, even business corporate tag is likely unconstitutional,249 having
been replaced by a test that leaves corporations open to general
jurisdiction only in the states of their headquarters and incorporation.250
Justice Gorsuch is right to wonder how “special protections” for
corporations came to be and how they became so constricting.251 But
for the first time in over seventy-five years, a crack of daylight from the
Court illuminates the minimum-contacts test as pragmatically
disastrous, ahistorical, and intellectually vapid.252 Perhaps it might not
haunt us forever. But to rid ourselves of it we need something to replace
it. Below, I consider some possibilities.

244. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1038–39
(2021).
245. See supra note 55.
246. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549,
1560 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
247. Borchers, Muddy-Booted, supra note 28, at 29.
248. See supra notes 142–215 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011).
251. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1039 &
n.5 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
252. Cf. Borchers, Muddy-Booted, supra note 28, at 25, 28 n.71 (noting that
jurisdictional due process infuses concepts such as “interstate federalism”
and “state sovereignty” that are completely alien to providing a person
with “due process of law” (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980))); Hoffheimer, Stealth Revolution,
supra note 31, at 501–02 (discussing effects of recent personal jurisdiction
cases on plaintiffs).
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A.

General Law

Professor Sachs argues that Pennoyer meant to give the Court
direct review over state-court interpretations of general jurisdictional
law, and thus de facto require state courts to conform.253 This suggestion
is intriguing. The Supreme Court (pre-Erie), for example, attempted to
settle the law of contributory negligence in crossing railroad tracks by
motorists with the “stop, look, and listen” rule.254 This was a general
common-law rule that other courts (including state courts) were free to
follow or not, and many did not.255 While Erie drastically reduced the
federal courts’ participation in expounding on general-law subjects, it
did not end it. Interstate disputes, admiralty law, and other topics are
ones in which the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, resort
to the general law.256
If I understand Professor Sachs correctly, his proposal is that the
Supreme Court review state-court assertions of jurisdiction via the Due
Process Clause. State jurisdictional law, even if statutory (as it was in
Pope) is—as I understand his position—open to direct review by the
Supreme Court on its view of general law. As Professor Sachs puts it:
“This meant that state courts . . . needed to change their jurisdictional
practices. Instead of taking their own view of the general law (let alone
abrogating it by statute), states now had to hew to the Supreme Court’s
view of things—including its view of the reach of state law.”257 He makes
several arguments as to how the general law has evolved and that such
review might not look so different from the minimum-contacts test and
could be workable in practice.258
Here he and I part ways.259 I concede it is possible that, in the postPennoyer era, the Supreme Court might have claimed the power to
review—under general law—state-court decisions applying the general
253. Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1288.
254. Note, Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Stop, Look, and Listen Rule, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 926, 930 (1930).
255. See Jason M. Solomon, Juries, Social Norms, and Civil Justice, 65 Ala.
L. Rev. 1121, 1164–65 (2014); see also Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at
1288 (“To the Court, jurisdictional doctrine was just a branch of the
ordinary general law, one on which federal and state courts could amicably
disagree.”). Professor Sachs is correct that the Supreme Court (and other
federal courts) apply general law in some areas of the law. Id. at 1255–69.
256. See, e.g., Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1255–69 (discussing
applicability of general law concepts—including the “thalweg” rule—to
border disputes between states).
257. Id. at 1306.
258. Id. at 1314–16.
259. But in so doing, I offer my thanks as he has finally caught the attention
of Justices of the current Court on the fundamental question of whether
the Due Process Clause and the minimum-contacts test ought to control
forum choice between states.
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law of jurisdiction. But in Pope and like cases, the state courts weren’t
applying the general law of jurisdiction; they were applying state
statutes that clearly flouted the general law. As is true today, a state
court is required to follow state law, unless it is unconstitutional,
regardless of whether it’s at war with the general law. Decisions of the
Swift v. Tyson260 era were pellucidly clear on this point. Once a state
passed a statute, it localized the subject and took it out of the general
law.261
Thus, the idea that an evolving general law, articulated by the
Supreme Court, could sit atop the judicial system to referee state-court
jurisdiction runs up against some fundamental absolutes. It is possible
that the Pennoyer Court meant to give state courts an incentive to
follow its lead through what Professor Sachs calls its “in terrorem”
effect.262 He argues that state courts not adhering to the Supreme
Court’s view of the general law—on, for example, the necessity of prejudgment attachment for in rem jurisdiction—would fall into line
because they risked reversal on direct review if they deviated.263 Perhaps
so if states stuck (as did Oregon in the time of Pennoyer)264 to just
employing general jurisdictional law. But state-court personal
jurisdiction was entering the age of statutes. Some were already in
effect, such as New York’s joint-debtors statute265 and the Pope-like
corporate-jurisdiction statutes.266 Then would come nonresidentmotorist statutes267 and the now-ubiquitous long-arm statutes.268
Professor Sachs accuses the New York and North Carolina courts
(and presumably the several others) of “obstinately” refusing to follow
Supreme Court precedent.269 But those state courts weren’t discerning
260. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
261. Id. at 18.
262. Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1307.
263. See id.
264. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
265. D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 173 (1850).
266. See supra notes 225–30 and accompanying text.
267. E.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927) (discussing a Massachusetts
nonresident motorist statute).
268. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (West 2004); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
302 (McKinney 2010); see also Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild:
How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U.
L. Rev. 491, 496–97 (2004) (noting that all states have long-arm statutes).
269. Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1311. As I see it, there was nothing
obstinate about their behavior. They were applying state statutes and,
with good reason, did not see the Due Process Clause as limiting those
statutes. See, e.g., Grant v. Cananea Consol. Copper Co., 102 N.Y.S. 642,
643–44 (App. Div.), rev’d, 82 N.E. 191 (N.Y. 1907). They had no reason
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the general law; they were interpreting state statutes. State statutes
trumped and took their subjects out of the general-law realm.270
Aggressive jurisdictional rules that caught the Supreme Court’s
attention in the early 20th century were born of state statutes.271
A difference of opinion between the Supreme Court and the New
York Court of Appeals on a matter of general law was not necessarily
grounds for the latter abandoning its view; as Professor Sachs notes,
when it came to matters of general law, state and federal courts could
“amicably disagree.”272 Thus, the notion of the Supreme Court
reviewing state-court assertions of statutory long-arm jurisdiction
against the general law undercuts the concept of general law. General
law is just that—general. If a state statute commands its courts to take
jurisdiction based on casual corporate tag it is a matter of local—not
general—law.273 One need look no further than Swift v. Tyson, in which
the Supreme Court and the New York courts disagreed as to whether
extinguishing a past debt was sufficient consideration to make a bill
negotiable.274 New York courts were free to hold to their view of
consideration or be persuaded by the Supreme Court’s.275 But as to local
to consider the general law, because they were interpreting statutes.
Professor Sachs says that I “interpret this response, and the Supreme
Court’s equivocal rhetoric in subsequent cases, as reflecting persistent
uncertainty about Pennoyer’s commitment to independent review in
federal courts.” Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1311. I do not see it as
persistent uncertainty as to independent review in federal courts; I see it
as well-justified skepticism that the Due Process Clause rendered the New
York, North Carolina, and other statutes unconstitutional as to
enforcement of their judgments within their borders.
270. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1842) (differentiating decisions
based “upon . . . local statute” from those “deduce[d] . . . from the general
principles of commercial law”).
271. See, e.g., Hess, 274 U.S. 252 (discussing a nonresident motorist statute in
Massachusetts); Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S.
189, 191–92, 194–95 (1915) (discussing the corporate tag statute).
272. Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1288 (“To the Court, jurisdictional
doctrine was just a branch of the ordinary general law, one on which
federal and state courts could amicably disagree.”).
273. See, e.g., Swift, 41 U.S. at 18.
274. Id. at 16 (“[I]t is further contended, that by the law of New York, as thus
expounded by its Courts, a pre-existing debt does not constitute, in the
sense of the general rule, a valuable consideration applicable to negotiable
instruments.”).
275. See Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1288. In this important respect,
general common law differs from what is now called “federal common
law.” In the seminal case of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363 (1943), the Supreme Court announced a federal-common-law rule
as to which party bore the burden of loss on a forged endorsement of a
check issued by the United States and that Erie had no bearing on the
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matters (including those localized by statute), state courts had the final
say, unless the law was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court had no warrant to measure the Pope rule on
direct review against the general law of jurisdiction. Pope didn’t
articulate a general-law rule; it interpreted Section 432 of the New York
Code of Civil Procedure.276 This was quintessential state-law matter,
over which the Supreme Court has no say.277 In the age of jurisdictional
statutes, the Supreme Court’s only method of controlling state-court
jurisdiction was to construe Pennoyer’s vague due-process paragraph as
constitutional authority to regulate state-court assertions of
jurisdiction.278
Perhaps this is why Menefee, in a blizzard of non sequiturs,279
converted Pennoyer from (at most) a procedural due-process case to
one limiting state-court jurisdiction as a matter of substantive
jurisdictional due process. The Court had, long before Pennoyer,
announced rules of personal jurisdiction under the general law (on
collateral attack) that had to be followed by lower federal courts and
might persuade state courts.280 By 1878, when it decided Pennoyer, the
Supreme Court was beginning to lose its grip on personal-jurisdiction
rules a bit; and regained it by invoking what we now call procedural
due process to ensure compliance with jurisdictional rules (with, again,
those rules coming from elsewhere). But by 1915, the Court’s hands
were being pried loose by jurisdictional statutes.281
If the Court were to have any say about coming jurisdictional
innovations, such as nonresident motorist statutes, substantive
jurisdictional due process was its only route. Nonresident motorist
statutes addressed a new problem. With automobile ownership rising
quickly and auto accidents more numerous, the general law of
jurisdiction didn’t work very well. The only reliable method of asserting
in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident was in-state service of
process.282 Nonresident motorists, however, likely would have gone back
home after the collision but before suit was filed, meaning victims of
careless nonresident motorists would have to sue in the nonresident
matter. That rule, once announced, was pre-emptive—it became the rule
in state and federal court.
276. Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 87 N.Y. 137, 140 (1881).
277. See, e.g., Jankovich v. Ind. Toll Rd. Comm’n, 379 U.S. 487, 489 (1965)
(explaining that the Supreme Court lacks appellate jurisdiction if judgment
rests on adequate and independent state grounds).
278. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 194 (1915).
279. See supra notes 204–10 and accompanying text.
280. See Borchers, Constitutional Law, supra note 33, at 25–30.
281. Id. at 52.
282. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1877).
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motorist’s home state, a result that seemed unfair to many.283 The
Supreme Court sensibly held these statutes constitutional,284 but it
struggled to deal with, in particular, foreign corporations.285
As to foreign corporations, the Court tried to fit them into either
the consent or presence fictions.286 Along the way it created mysterious
distinctions. A corporation merely soliciting business in the forum state
was not subject to jurisdiction, but one doing more than mere
solicitation was.287 As Justice Gorsuch noted, decisions of that era
tolerated corporations having substantial business connections to the
forum state, while still retaining jurisdictional immunity.288 All this led
to constitutionalized jurisdiction being an unpredictable muddle, which
the Supreme Court tried to set straight in International Shoe—with (at
best) limited success. While the Court of the late 19th century was
competent to tidy up around the edges of the general law of jurisdiction,
it found itself in over its head trying to adapt a constitutionalized
jurisdictional jurisprudence to swiftly changing societal conditions.
All of which is to say that the general law won’t save us. Practically,
in a post-Erie world, the skills of federal courts in divining general law
rules have deteriorated.289 More fundamentally, state-court jurisdiction
is not now a matter of general law. Long-arm jurisdiction is controlled
by long-arm statutes—and thus jurisdiction is local, not general, law.290
B.

Leave it to the States

If substantive jurisdictional due process is illegitimate, and general
law has no large role to play, one option is to push due process back to
283. See, e.g., James J. Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current
Problems and Modern Trends, 5 UCLA L. Rev. 198, 213–14 (1958)
(discussing expansion of nonresident motorist statutes to vehicles other
than automobiles).
284. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354, 356–57 (1927).
285. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1036–
37 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
286. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17; see also Borchers,
Muddy-Booted, supra note 28, at 23.
287. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314 (discussing Washington Supreme Court
decision below, 154 P.2d 801 (1945)); see also Borchers, Muddy-Booted,
supra note 28, at 23.
288. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1036–37 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment)
(citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517–18
(1923)). In Rosenberg Bros., an Oklahoma defendant who purchased a
large amount of its merchandise from New York sellers was held not to
be doing business in New York. 260 U.S. at 517–18.
289. See Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1319.
290. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842); see also Borchers, Origins, supra
note 163, at 112 n.264 (collecting Swift-era cases in which state procedural
statutes were followed by diversity courts).
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the point where it checks only the most excessive assertions of
jurisdiction—just as in choice of law it checks only the most excessive
of state-court applications of forum law.291 I suggested this when I
proposed that due process defeat an assertion of jurisdiction only if the
forum put the defendant at a practical disadvantage defending the
case.292
I do not think this would cause the chaos some imagine. But it
would allow some assertions of jurisdiction that many would find
problematic. For example, if two Omahans were involved in a traffic
accident close to their homes, filing the case just a few miles away on
the Iowa side of the Missouri river (where the juries are more favorable
to plaintiffs) would not leave the defendant at much of a practical
disadvantage as a matter of geography. After all, there are counties in
Nebraska over 400 miles away from Omaha that would be much more
inconvenient venues than the Iowa ones just a quick trip across the
river.
I suspect state courts and legislatures would move quickly to avoid
blatant forum shopping. State courts could employ the doctrine of
forum non conveniens to steer such cases back to the parties’ homes.293
State venue statutes might not provide a venue for such a case.294
Federal courts could employ their venue transfer authority in diversity
and federal-question cases.295 State legislatures would surely cut back
on long-arm statutes going to the constitutional limits for fear of
flooding their courts. But a Supreme Court avulsion of this magnitude
seems unlikely.
C.

Federal Positive Law

Returning to general law would—according to Professor Sachs—
give Congress more authority to enact a federal statute that would act
291. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1980) (stating that for
a state to apply its law it “must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”). But see Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822–23 (1985) (discussing how a
complete lack of connection between most claims in a class action and the
forum state prevented the forum state from applying its law to the entire
dispute).
292. Borchers, Constitutional Law, supra note 33, at 94.
293. See, e.g., Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 16 (Cal. 1991); Fennell v.
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 987 N.E.2d 355, 357–58 (Ill. 2012); Chambers v.
Merrell-Dow Pharms., 519 N.E.2d 370, 372 (Ohio 1988).
294. For personal-injury actions, the Iowa venue statute allows venue “in the
county in which the defendant, or one of the defendants, is a resident or
in the county in which the injury or damage is sustained.” Iowa Code
§ 616.18 (2021). In the hypothetical case in the text, this would yield no
Iowa venues.
295. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
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as the Brussels Regulations do in the European Union.296 Congress,
however, likely already has this power because it is limited only by the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Under current law, the Fifth
Amendment probably requires only minimum contacts with the United
States as a whole—not with any particular state—for federal-court
personal jurisdiction.297 However, despite some federal bills having been
introduced to modestly enlarge state-court jurisdiction, the political will
to do so is lacking.298 I proposed an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to ensure that U.S. plaintiffs injured at home by
foreign-manufactured products have at least one U.S. forum available,299
but it’s not on the agenda of the federal rules advisory committee. At
best, these are long-run solutions.
D.

Unite Jurisdictional and Procedural Due Process

Here I revive a suggestion I advanced tentatively before.300
Jurisdictional due process is isolated from any other branch of dueprocess law.301 If it were true substantive due process, it would require

296. See Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1316–17; Stephen E. Sachs, How
Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1301,
1315–16, 1328 (2014). I am not entirely clear on why Professor Sachs
believes that returning to the general law would enhance Congress’s
powers, except perhaps by shoving the Constitution further into the
background, given that the general law was not “federal” in the sense of
being pre-emptive of state law. However, nothing turns on this as we agree
that Congress has the power to enact a national uniform long-arm statute
that would act as the Brussels Regulations do in the European Union. See
Regulation 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, arts. 5, 7–26, 2012 O.J.
(L 351) 1, 7–11 (setting out when someone living in one E.U. member
state may be sued in another), amended by Regulation 542/2014, 2014
O.J. (L 163) 1 (EU), and Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/281,
2015 O.J. (L 54) 1 (EU).
297. See Hay et al., supra note 98, at 446–50.
298. See Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(K)(2): A Way to (Partially) Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess,
67 Am. U. L. Rev. 413, 446 (2017) [hereinafter Borchers, Extending]
(discussing failure of a bill to extend jurisdiction over foreign products
manufacturers to advance out of committee). Federal statutes also expand
personal jurisdiction under the authority of the Fifth Amendment. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 22 (Clayton Act defendants subject to jurisdiction
wherever “found”); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (federal interpleader actions).
299. Borchers, Extending, supra note 298 at 443–44.
300. See Patrick J. Borchers, Jones v. Flowers: An Essay on a Unified Theory
of Procedural Due Process, 40 Creighton L. Rev. 343, 349–52 (2007).
301. See Borchers, Muddy-Booted, supra note 28, at 22 (“[J]urisdictional due
process is a constitutional outcast.”).

86

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Ford and “Corporate Tag Jurisdiction” in the Pennoyer Era

only a showing of rationality,302 and few forum choices (particularly
plaintiffs choosing to sue at home) could be said to be irrational.303 It is
no longer part of the “fair notice” branch of due process.304 Personal
service of process on the defendant outside the forum state provides
excellent notice, but does nothing to give the forum-state’s courts power
to hear the case.
The most promising branch of due process law is the “fair
procedures” branch. This usually arises in administrative proceedings
where it acts to ensure that private parties have an adequate
opportunity to be heard when a government benefit is at risk.305
Currently it takes the form of a cost-benefit analysis.306 Persons are
entitled to enough process to make the proceeding relatively sure of an
accurate result without costs that overwhelm the value of what is at
stake.307 Thus, for instance, a welfare beneficiary threatened with loss
of her benefits is entitled to an oral hearing before a neutral decisionmaker,308 but not to a jury trial or a government-funded lawyer, as she
would be if charged with a serious crime.309
Transplanting that framework to assessing state-court jurisdiction
would lead to a more workable and just jurisprudence. It would expand
302. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 309, 313–15 (1993)
(noting that there must be “any conceivable rational basis justifying”
Congressional statutory classifications “for purposes of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment”).
303. See Weinstein, supra note 33, at 232–34; cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 326 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I
question whether a judge’s decision to apply the law of his own State
could ever be described as wholly irrational.”).
304. See Effron, supra note 31, at 27–28 (discussing the unwinding of notice
from jurisdictional power). Current constitutional law regarding notice
requires only that the form of notice be “reasonably calculated” to inform
the adverse party of the proceedings. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950); Cf. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 239
(2006) (holding that notice of tax sale of a house inadequate where taxing
authority had reason to know that the attempted notice had failed to
reach the property owner).
305. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266–67 (1970) (stating that
“fair hearing” is required before welfare recipient’s benefits can be
terminated).
306. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344–45 (1976).
307. See, e.g., Tavarez v. O’Malley, 826 F.2d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner,
J.) (stating “the cost-benefit approach of Mathews v. Eldridge . . . asks
essentially whether the particular procedural safeguard that the plaintiff
is urging would save more in costs of legal error than it would add in
administrative or other costs”); see also Borchers, Muddy-Booted, supra
note 28, at 28–29.
308. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267–68.
309. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963).
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the reach of state courts, but state courts and legislatures would likely
trim their long-arm statutes to fit the state’s policy choices. It would
not be a free-for-all. If the forum choice imposes significant extra costs
on the parties or presents a significant risk of an inaccurate resolution—
due to remoteness from the evidence or the need to apply an unfamiliar
law—it should be unconstitutional. If we look at a few recent Supreme
Court cases to estimate the relative costs put on the parties and assess
any obstacle to an accurate result, jurisdictional results begin to look a
lot more sensible.
To begin with Ford, the result is obviously correct. The injury
states are the forums that impose the least costs on both parties and
allow the finder of fact access to the evidence, giving the best chance of
an accurate result. Although the Court did not mention it, likely the
state courts would apply their own law, or that of a neighboring state
whose law would be reasonably familiar. In the Minnesota Ford case,
the plaintiff also surely had a suit against the driver that likely could
have only been brought there,310 so relocating the products case to
another state would have been inefficient.
Cases the Court got wrong (on the proposed standard) include
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson311 and J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.312 In both cases, the Court refused to allow
plaintiffs in products liability cases to sue where they were injured.313
Those states would have been the most cost-efficient for all parties and
would have allowed access to the crucial evidence. Moreover, in WorldWide, the decision increased the costs by requiring a separate suit
against two dismissed defendants (assuming the plaintiffs wished to do
so) and J. McIntyre effectively denied the plaintiff any United States
forum,314 shifting the social costs of the plaintiff’s injury to his home
state. In both cases, the state courts likely would have applied their
own laws.
But moving to a procedural-due-process model would not always
allow jurisdiction. A case that the Court got right (on this test) is
denying jurisdiction in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v.
Brown.315 In that case, the injury occurred in France because of
defective tires produced by a foreign subsidiary of the U.S. tire
manufacturer Goodyear.316 The suit was brought in North Carolina,
whose only connection was that it was home to the families of the boys
310. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2021).
311. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
312. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
313. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288, 299; McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877–78.
314. See Borchers, Extending, supra note 298, at 444–45.
315. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
316. Id. at 918.
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killed in the French bus accident.317 Most witnesses to the accident were
likely in France, and obtaining their testimony would be cumbersome
at best.318 Expert examination of the accident site and the failed tire
would require transporting experts to France.319 Evidence of the
manufacturing process would likely be abroad as well.320 The case for
applying forum law—or any U.S. law—would have been weak, perhaps
unconstitutional.321 One can sympathize with the plaintiffs’ desire to
sue at home, but with foreign evidence, a foreign accident site, and
foreign law, they sit in a much different position than the World-Wide
and J. McIntyre plaintiffs.

Conclusion
I come to bury the minimum-contacts test and not to praise
corporate tag jurisdiction. Corporate tag jurisdiction—at least in its
casual incarnation—was exorbitant and random in its operation,
though one can say the same of tagging individual defendants. Results
like Pope are obviously unconstitutional under the current at-home test.
But as a test of the relationship between the Due Process Clause and
state-court jurisdiction, the corporate tag cases are nearly perfect. New
York’s Pope rule clearly flouted the general law of jurisdiction. It
withstood repeated attacks on due-process grounds; the New York
courts refused to yield and read Pennoyer to bring the general law of
jurisdiction into play only if the judgment was attacked outside New
York. The Pope rule didn’t fly under the radar. The Supreme Court
twice encountered Pope assertions of jurisdiction and in each case took
the same view as the New York courts—the general law would come
into play only if the judgment were to be attacked in a court of a
different sovereignty.
Pope was founded on a state statute, as were similar decisions of
other state high courts, all of whom paid little or no heed to the Due
Process Clause or the general law. The reason for this is
straightforward. As state courts, they were duty-bound to interpret
state law and saw no constitutional impediment to enforcing their laws.
While those state courts surely applied general law in tort and contract
law where there were few statutes, the age of statutes was coming to
state-court jurisdiction. As jurisdictional statutes, they had to be
317. Id.
318. Id. at 922.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 920–21.
321. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 402–04, 408 (1930) (discussing
how a Mexican state’s law must be applied involving a boat accident in
Mexico where the only connection to the forum state of Texas was
plaintiff’s residence).
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interpreted to the letter. It was a matter of state law over which the
Supreme Court had no say unless the Court were to declare casual
corporate tag jurisdiction unconstitutional, which it finally did in
1915—thirty-seven years after Pennoyer.
Pope and its downfall make Justice Gorsuch’s point that
constitutionalized personal-jurisdiction law has worked to the
advantage of corporate defendants. While Ford handed corporate
defendants a rare defeat in the Supreme Court, the minimum-contacts
test has worked to protect corporate defendants even at the expense of
giving an individual plaintiff any realistic access to justice.
International Shoe is routinely hailed as the great liberator of statecourt jurisdiction from the formalisms of the Pennoyer era,322 but close
inspection reveals a much more complicated picture than the
conventional wisdom paints.
We are perhaps on the edge of a paradigm shift. Multiple Justices
are questioning the stability of the foundations of modern jurisdictional
law, and with good reason. Current law is entirely ahistorical and
unsatisfactory in practice. Burying the minimum-contacts test need not
usher in an era of unregulated state-court jurisdiction. Procedural due
process holds out the possibility of a stable jurisdictional regime with
greater predictability and fairer results.

322. See Sachs, Pennoyer, supra note 3, at 1251 (noting that “Pennoyer has a
bad rap”).
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